In Defense of the Ministerial Exception by Lund, Christopher C.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 90 | Number 1 Article 2
12-1-2011
In Defense of the Ministerial Exception
Christopher C. Lund
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol90/iss1/2
IN DEFENSE OF THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION*
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND**
Over the past forty years, courts have developed the "ministerial
exception," a legal doctrine which immunizes churches from
employment-based claims brought by their clergy (and others
with significant religious duties). The lower courts all recognize
this exception. But its contours remain fiercely disputed. And the
Supreme Court has never clarified its boundaries or even
confirmed that it exists at all.
This Article defends the ministerial exception and tries to flesh
out its various rationales in a systematic and comprehensive
fashion. It suggests that the ministerial exception may be
profitably thought of not as a single indivisible whole, but rather
as the overlap of several different discrete immunities, each
backed by different justifications. It divides the ministerial
exception into three components-a relational component, a
conscience component, and an autonomy component.
Examining each component separately, this Article tries to offer
a richer explanation as to why we have this thing called the
ministerial exception.
This Article comes at an opportune time. Nearly forty years alter
the birth of the ministerial exception in the lower courts, the first
ministerial exception case is now before the Supreme Court of
the United States. The case is Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, and the
Court will have to decide both whether the ministerial exception
* © 2011 Christopher C. Lund.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to
thank a number of people for thoughtful comments at various stages of this Article-
Sarah Abramowicz, Richard Albert, Greg Bowman, Kathleen Brady, Kingsley Browne,
Marc DeGirolami, Mary Jean Dolan, Chad Flanders, Lance Gable, Rick Garnett, Caroline
Giordano, Michael Helfand, Paul Horwitz, John Inazu, Kerry Kornblatt, Douglas Laycock,
Justin Long, Michael McCann, Aaron Perzanowski, Eric Rassbach, Steven Smith, Charles
Sullivan, Robert Tuttle, Howard Wasserman, and Steven Winter. All errors, of course, are
mine. By way of disclosure, I served as counsel of record for the amicus brief filed by the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod that is cited infra in note 150. None of the views
expressed here, however, should be attributed to the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 90
exists and what it covers. After looking at the ministerial
exception in general, this Article concludes by offering some
thoughts on the issues presented in H osanna-Tabor.
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INTRODUCTION
A hallmark of American law is that employers cannot use things
like race, sex, and age as criteria in employment decisions.' Whether
employers are public or private, the law generally forbids such
discrimination. But an equally august principle in American law is
1. See infra Part L.A (providing an introduction to employment law).
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that of religious liberty. Religious organizations have long had, as a
matter of constitutional right, freedom to choose their leaders without
being hindered, second-guessed, or supervised by the state.
In recent years, these two principles have collided. The result has
been the "ministerial exception." Lower courts have held that
churches are generally immune from employment-related claims
brought by their ministers (and others with highly religious duties),
but that churches have no such immunity from claims brought by
other employees.2
While courts agree on the broad contours of the ministerial
exception, they disagree on many of the specifics. Courts differ on
some straightforward matters-like which job positions count as
ministerial.3 But they also divide on trickier and more conceptual
questions-like whether the ministerial exception should protect
religious organizations in the absence of any religious doctrine
requiring discrimination4 and whether it should apply in cases where
the minister continues to work for the church.' A storm of recent
articles push things in another direction, arguing that the ministerial
2. See discussion infra Part II (providing an introduction to the ministerial
exception). This Article uses the word "church" throughout to refer collectively to
religious organizations like churches, temples, and mosques without intending any
exclusively Christian reference. Other articles do the same. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and theRightto Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 n.2 (1981).
3. Courts have, for example, come to quite different conclusions about whether
parochial school teachers fall within the ministerial exception. Compare Coulee Catholic
Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 892 (Wis. 2009) (holding that
such a teacher falls within the ministerial exception), and Clapper v. Chesapeake
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 904528, at *8 (4th Cir. Dec.
29, 1998) (same), with EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597
F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that such a teacher does not fall within the
ministerial exception), and DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.
1993) (same).
4. Compare Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006), withdrawn upon
grant of reh'g, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), available at 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at
*28 (holding that the ministerial exception generally only shields churches when they
argue that the discrimination was required by their religious tenets), with Petruska v.
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (rehearing the case after the decision in
the first Petruska and holding that the ministerial exception provides blanket protection
for churches with regard to employment discrimination claims by ministers).
5. Courts seem more comfortable deciding such cases because they do not present
the danger of a church being forced to rehire a minister against its will. See Elvig v. Calvin
Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2004) (letting hostile work environment
claims proceed). Butsee Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238,
1246 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that such claims are barred by the ministerial exception).
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exception should be abolished altogether or at least dramatically
narrowed.6
This Article defends the ministerial exception against its critics.
It aims to provide a fuller account of why a ministerial exception
makes some sense. At the conceptual level, it argues against those
who would see the ministerial exception as a single entity with a
single theory of justification.7 It proposes instead that the ministerial
exception is better viewed as the combination of a number of distinct
but overlapping immunities, each backed by a variety of rationales. It
suggests that the ministerial exception can be helpfully divided into
three component parts-the relational component, the conscience
component, and the autonomycomponent.
First is the relational component. Organizations founded on
shared religious principles, simply to exist, must have freedom to
choose those religious principles. The laws forbidding religious
discrimination make a lot of sense, but they make much less sense
when applied to religious organizations. In the context of
6. See Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy
Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1522 (2007) (noting how "[t]he
ministerial exception has had its share of critics"). For examples of commentators arguing
against the ministerial exception, see generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law?
The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New Wars ofReligion: The
Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 53-56 (2010); Marci A.
Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1099 (2004); Lauren P. Heller, Modifying the Ministerial Exception: Providing
Ministers with a Remedy for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII While
Maintaining First Amendment Protections of Religious Freedom, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
663 (2007); Stuart McPhail, Being FAIR to Religion: Rumsfeld v. FAIR 's Impact on the
Associational Rights of Religious Organizations, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 221 (2009);
Elizabeth R. Pozolo, One Step Forward, One Step Back. Why the Third Circuit Got It
Right the First Time in Petruska v. Gannon University, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093 (2008);
Jessica R. Vartanian, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices by Religious
Employers and Justifications for a More NarrowMinisterial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV.
1049 (2009); Katherine Bell, Note, The Ministerial Exception: Rethinking the Third
Circuit's Approach to Ministerial Discrimination, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 753 (2008);
Sarah Fulton, Note, Petruska v. Gannon University: A Crack in the Stained Glass Ceiling,
14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 197 (2007); Benton C. Martin, Comment, Protecting
Preachers from Prejudice. Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to
Title VII, 59 EMORY L.J. 1297 (2010).
7. Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle, two of the finest scholars in the field, remarked about
how "the ministerial exception is a doctrine in search of a new and more precise theory of
justification." Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations.
Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119,
134 (2009). They continue: "Such a theory is especially important as the exception gets
pressed in new and different circumstances, and limitations on it appear." Id.
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employment, churches should have a relatively free hand to use
religion as a criterion. Lutheran churches should be able, as almost a
categorical matter, to prefer Lutherans to Presbyterians and
Protestants to Catholics.
Second is the conscience component. This is probably what most
people instinctively think of as the justification for exempting
religious organizations from the anti-discrimination laws. The
conscience component allows religious organizations to discriminate
when they assert a basis for it in religious doctrine. The intersection
of sex and religion offers the most well-known example. Orthodox
Judaism, the Greek Orthodox Church, the Catholic Church, and a
number of Protestant groups see an all-male clergy as divinely
ordained. The conscience component protects them from having to
break their religious obligations to adhere to the government's
commands. It protects them for the same reasons that one would
want to protect the Native American Church's right to use peyote in
worship8 or the right of Orthodox Jews to wear yarmulkes.' No one
should be punished by the state for doing what his religion commands
unless it is absolutely necessary.'0
Third is the autonomy component (or the ministerial exception
simpliciter). Perhaps the most important part of the whole, this is
what courts have generally referred to as the ministerial exception.
Here we are talking about a categorical rule barring religious leaders
(those with significant religious duties) from bringing any sort of
employment-based claim against their churches. After opening with a
general defense of such a blanket exception, the Article then
demonstrates how there are four discrete and separate problems that
would arise if the ministerial exception was not there. These include
the reinstatement problem, the restructuring problem, the control
problem, and the inquiryproblem. There is thus no single reason for
the ministerial exception. There are instead many reasons-reasons
which overlap with each other, like the circles in a Venn diagram.
This Article tries to examine those reasons in a more methodical and
8. SeeEmp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990) (involving
such a claim).
9. SeeGoldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (involving such a claim).
10. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) ("In such cases, to make
accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a
particularly delicate task, because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to
the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing [governmental
sanction]." (citation omitted)).
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comprehensive way, in an attempt both to explain why we have the
ministerial exception and to reveal its irreducibly pluralistic roots.
Part I of this Article discusses the necessary background for any
understanding of the ministerial exception, providing a general
description of statutory anti-discrimination law as well as the
constitutional doctrine relating to church autonomy. Part II brings
them together and explores the historical development of the
ministerial exception. Parts III and IV, respectively, explore the
relational and conscience components and the arguments in support
of them. Part V, the bulk of this Article, examines the autonomy
component, exhaustively organizing and analyzing the various
justifications for it. Part VI considers and responds to objections.
Finally, Part VII offers thoughts on Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC,"1 the
ministerial exception case now before the Supreme Court.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
This opening Part sets the stage for the others, providing an
overview to statutory employment law, the constitutional principles
of church autonomy, and their conflicted history together. We begin
first with some basics of employment law and, in particular,
employment discrimination law.
A. An Introduction to Employment Law
In the United States, relationships between employers and
employees are regulated in a hodge-podge fashion through an
assortment of different laws. Some of these laws are well-known. The
Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, creates a minimum wage,
forbids child labor, and regulates overtime.12 Others are less well-
known. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits most
private employers from subjecting their employees to polygraph
tests. 13 These two examples both involve federal statutes. But
employees have other rights too, whether under local ordinances,
state laws, or the federal Constitution. 4
11. 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2011)
(No. 10-553).
12. SeeFair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207, 212 (2006).
13. See Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006).
14. For a comprehensive list of the various protections that employees have in this
country, see B. Glenn George, Justice in Simplicity: Perspectives on Knowledge and Access
in American EmploymentLaw, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 385-92 (2010).
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Anti-discrimination laws make up a crucial component of this
effort toward fairness in the workplace. In 1964, Congress passed
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and
religion, as well as retaliation for complaints about acts of
discrimination. 5 Statutes enacted later forbid discrimination on the
basis of age (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 or
"ADEA"), 6 pregnancy (the Pregnancy Discrimination Act or
"PDA"), 7 and disability (the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
or "ADA")."8 Other laws prohibit discrimination against military
veterans19 and against all people on the basis of their genetic
information.2 °
From the plain text of these employment discrimination laws,
they would seem to apply with full force to churches and other
religious organizations. When Title VII was initially drafted, the
House version of the bill completely exempted religious groups.2" But
that broad exception was ultimately replaced with a narrower one
that shielded religious groups only from charges of religious
discrimination, and even then, only with regard to employees doing
religious work.22 This exception was broadened in 1972-as a result,
Title VII today exempts religious employers from all claims of
religious discrimination.23 But the text of Title VII gives religious
organizations no immunity from claims of retaliation or claims of
15. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2006)).
16. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West 2011).
17. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
18. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (West Supp. 2011).
19. See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2006).
20. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 ("GINA"), Pub. L. No.
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
21. SeeH.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 12 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2402.
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006)); see also Janet S. Belcove-Shalin,
Ministerial Exception and Title VII Claims: Case Law Grid Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 86, 89-91
(2002) (examining the legislative history behind the change).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) ("This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society .. "). There is a separate exception to Title
VII's prohibition on religious discrimination specifically for church-owned schools under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2). There is also the bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ") provision, which will be discussed separately. See infra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text.
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race, sex, or national origin discrimination. And none of the
subsequently enacted anti-discrimination statutes treat religious
organizations any differently either.24
There are, however, two aspects to the federal anti-
discrimination laws that somewhat indirectly relate to religious
organizations. First, there are bona fide occupational qualifications
("BFOQs"). To the extent that protected characteristics like race,
sex, age, or religion are "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of [a] particular business," employers (both religious and
nonreligious ones) can take them into account.25 But courts construe
this provision quite narrowly. 26 The leading case struck down a
battery manufacturer's policy that barred fertile women from jobs
involving lead exposure. 27 The Court assumed that the jobs created
serious fetal-health risks, but pointed out that fertile women could
still physically do those jobs-which is the only relevant consideration
under the text of the BFOQ provision.28 Religious organizations may
be able to use the BFOQs to create a kind of ministerial exception,
but this is far from clear-who knows what you would get, for
example, were you to ask a jury whether sex discrimination in the
24. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") has a section dealing specifically
with religious organizations. It says religious organizations can give "preference in
employment to individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such [organization] of its activities" and that they can "require that all
applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such organization." 42
U.S.C.A. § 12113(d) (West Supp. 2011). It is not entirely clear what work this provision is
supposed to do. Religious groups obviously do not need to be shielded from claims of
religious discrimination under the ADA, because the ADA does not forbid religious
discrimination. Maybe the best reading is that religious groups can discriminate on the
basis of disability when they do so for religious reasons. But in any event, reviewing courts
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") have concluded that this
provision really has no weight. See, e.g., Leavy v. Congregation Beth Shalom, 490 F. Supp.
2d 1011, 1018 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (noting the ADA statutory exception but then concluding
that the ADA, like Title VII, "treats an employment dispute between a minister and his or
her church like any other employment dispute" (quoting Dolquist v. Heartland
Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 n.6 (D. Kan. 2004)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(a) (2011)
(adopting the same position).
25. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006). The
ADA has somewhat different language, allowing employers to insist on qualifications that
are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113(a).
26. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("[T]he bfoq exception
was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination .... ).
27. Seelnt'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
28. See id. at 204-06 (noting that "permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to
ability to perform the duties of the job" and "[flertile women ... participate in the
manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else").
[Vol. 90
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priesthood is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the
Catholic Church.29
Second, there is the exception in our federal anti-discrimination
laws for small employers. Title VII and the ADA apply only to
employers with fifteen or more full-time employees; the ADEA
applies only to those with twenty or more.3" Some religious employers
will be protected by these numerical thresholds, as many churches
have fewer than fifteen full-time employees. But the story is actually
more complicated than that. A small Catholic parish with five full-
time employees will still be subject to all these employment-
discrimination laws. This is because our laws consider the whole
Catholic Church-not the individual parish-to be the relevant unit
for number-counting purposes. This comes from the "single
employer" doctrine, which says that when two businesses are heavily
interrelated, "the number of employees of [the] two separate
businesses may be combined to meet the fifteen-employee
requirement."31
One sees immediately how this will differently affect hierarchical
and congregational churches. With hierarchical churches (like the
Catholic Church), the parish and the higher church are deeply
interrelated, so individual parishes become bound by Title VII. With
congregational churches (like Baptist churches), there is no higher
church-and so such churches become exempt from Title VII. To put
it another way, small congregational churches are treated like small
employers (exempt from the anti-discrimination laws), while small
29. The narrowness of the BFOQs makes this issue more complicated than people
sometimes think. The Catholic Church would not get absolute deference on the issue of
whether priests really need to be male. SeeW. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 423
(1985) (noting that the BFOQs "plainly do[] not permit the trier of fact to give complete
deference to the employer's decision"). Many would argue that the Catholic Church's
views, though based in theology and tradition, simply lack the sort of objective factual
basis required for BFOQs. SeeCity of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
("Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain
kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons ... ").
30. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006);
ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2006); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in Pragmatist
Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1025, 1067 (2010) (questioning
why we would have a system where "employers with fifteen to nineteen employees [have]
to comply with Title VII and the ADA, but not the ADEA").
31. 1 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 5.02[5], at 5-15 (2d ed.
2009); see also Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer
Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2006)
(explaining further how "the 'single employer doctrine'. . . treats affiliated and
interrelated corporations as if they are one entity-a 'single employer' ").
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hierarchical churches are treated like small parts of a large employer
(not exempt). This point may help to explain why one rarely sees
ministerial exception cases involving Baptist churches, although such
cases involving Catholic churches are frequent.32
This disparate impact does not make the numerical thresholds
unconstitutional. But they are still problematic. For both
congregational and hierarchical churches, church structure matters
for deeply theological reasons. Religious freedom, therefore, should
mean having free choice among various types of church governance.
But Title VII effectively penalizes the hierarchical choice:
Hierarchical churches end up bound by the anti-discrimination laws,
while congregational churches are not. One sees the problems with
this in obvious display with one recent case that involved a sexual
harassment suit against an Episcopal church that had only four
employees.33 The court's decision to let the case go forward was
grounded entirely on observations about the relatively hierarchical
nature of the Episcopalian Church.34
B. An Introduction to Church Autonomy
The ministerial exception arises from the conflict between
employment laws and constitutional principles of church autonomy.
Having introduced the former, we now turn to the latter. Ideas about
church autonomy long predate the rise of modern employment law,
which means that church-autonomy principles first developed in
contexts somewhat removed from that setting. Yet, as we shall
32. For examples of cases involving claims against an entity within the Catholic
Church, see generally Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238
(10th Cir. 2010); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th
Cir. 2006); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83
F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7
F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993);
Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese, 233 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Guinan v.
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Pardue
v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005);
Archdiocese of Wash. v. Moersen, 925 A.2d 659 (Md. 2007).
33. See Krasner v. Episcopal Diocese of Long Island, 431 F. Supp. 2d 320, 323
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
34. Id. at 325 (stressing how the Diocese was intimately involved with the local church
generally and with the plaintiffs employment, specifying her job duties, offering her
training, providing her with health benefits, and controlling aspects of her compensation
and hours).
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explore, these principles still have implications for modern
employment law.
1. The Religion Clauses in Brief
Insofar as the ministerial exception has roots in the Constitution,
those roots are found in the First Amendment of the Constitution:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ."" The first half of this
Amendment is known as the Establishment Clause; the second half is
known as the Free Exercise Clause. About fifteen years after they
were adopted, Thomas Jefferson summarized their combined effect as
"building a wall of separation between Church and State."3
Over the past two centuries, the Supreme Court has wrestled
with the meaning of these two clauses. On the Free Exercise side, the
Court has heard a number of cases involving individual believers
asking for exemptions from laws which would otherwise prevent them
from following their religions. The Court used to generally require
such exemptions, but in recent years it has moved away from that
position.37 On the Establishment Clause side, the Court in the past
decade has addressed everything from government-sponsored
religious displays," to government-sponsored prayers in the public
schools,3 9 to voucher programs which include religious schools.4 °
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. See Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptists (1802), in FROM MANY,
ONE: READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 344-45 (Richard C.
Sinopoli ed., 1997).
37. Under the Sherbert/Yoder framework, associated with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), burdens on religious exercise had
to be justified by compelling governmental interests. See SherberF 374 U.S. at 403; Yoder,
406 U.S. at 215. This changed in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), when the Court held that burdens usually did not require
justification if the laws were neutral and generally applicable. See id. at 879. The
relationship between Smith and the ministerial exception is important and will be
addressed separately later. See infra Part VI (examining the claim that the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith undermines the ministerial exception).
38. The Court has sometimes upheld them and sometimes struck them down.
Compare McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (striking down a
government-sponsored Ten Commandments display), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 677 (2005) (upholding a government-sponsored Ten Commandments display). For
more on these two cases, see generally Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future
of the Establishment Clause, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 60-61 (2010), http://www
.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/22/LR Co112010n22Lund.pdf.
39. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290 (2000) (striking down a
government-sponsored prayer program in the public schools).
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One striking aspect is how the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses have developed along entirely separate tracks with only
occasional connections threading the two clauses together. The cases
are separate; the principles are separate; the doctrines are separate.
All this seems quite curious for a legal provision that mentions the
word "religion" only once.4 Others have searched for a unitary
meaning to attach to the Religion Clauses. If forced to do so, I might
put it this way: The Free Exercise Clause gives people the right to
practice their religion, while the Establishment Clause denies the
government the right to practice religion.42 By requiring the
government to stay out of religious affairs, the Constitution commits
matters of religious belief and practice exclusively to the private
sphere. Religion is put entirely on one side of the state-action line.
On its own, of course, this formulation is too abstract to do much
real work. But even at this level of generality, one can begin to see
how it might come into play with regard to the matters of church
autonomy we are about to investigate. When the government gets
involved in church affairs, it creates problems with respect to both
clauses. A church losing control of its religious matters implicates the
Free Exercise Clause. The government gaining control of those
religious matters implicates the Establishment Clause. From this
crude starting point, we turn to the Court's church autonomy cases,
which provide a fuller picture.
2. Church Autonomy in the Context of Church-Property Disputes
There is one church autonomy case that set the stage for all the
others-the Supreme Court's 1871 decision in Watson v. Jones.43
Watson involved a fight over control of the property of the Walnut
Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky. Slavery had split
the church into two factions. The anti-slavery side made up a majority
40. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002) (upholding a voucher
program that included religious schools).
41. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 293, 311 (2002) ("[T]he First Amendment contains only one religion clause, not
two, and the text will not admit of an interpretation that tries to assign two different
meanings to the word religion, which appears only once." (emphasis omitted)).
42. For another version similar to mine, see Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes,
Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 n.8 (1991) ("We treat the First
Amendment as containing a single, coherent Religion Clause whose establishment and
free exercise provisions are both in the service of the same fundamental value: religious
freedom.").
43. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). For a helpful overview of Watson, see Kurt T. Lash,
Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 456-59 (2009).
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of the congregation and was supported by the national church (the
General Assembly). The pro-slavery side was a distinct minority of
the congregation, but it constituted a majority of both the trustees
(who held legal title to the property) and the Session (the elders who
governed the church). Both sides went to court claiming to be the
true church, entitled to the building's full and exclusive use."
In Watson, the Supreme Court first articulated the notion of
church autonomy. The Court explained that federal courts had to do
their best to stay out of internal church controversies, as churches had
rights to govern themselves and resolve their own disputes. 45 Watson
traced this autonomy back to an idea about "implied consent"-when
one joins a church, one implicitly consents to the church making its
own decisions.46 People can choose to leave or they can choose to
stay. But so long as they choose to stay, they accept the church doing
things its own way. Dissenters cannot use the coercive force of the
government to force a change in the church's religious views,
practices, or governance.47
Watson explained that the overarching desire to maximize church
autonomy would require courts to adopt different approaches in
church schism cases, depending on whether the church was
44. The conflict between the two sides had become basically irremediable all the way
back in 1865, when the national Presbyterian body (the General Assembly) held that those
who had supported slavery could not be members of any Presbyterian church unless they
first repented. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 691; see also Lash, supra note 43, at 456 &
n.35 (providing more background).
45. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29 ("The right to organize voluntary religious
associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association,
and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and
officers within the general association, is unquestioned.").
46. Id. at 729 ("All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent
to this government, and are bound to submit to it." (emphasis added)).
47. In a case that ultimately reached the Supreme Court, a district court put it in these
terms almost a century ago:
He need associate himself with no religious organization if he does not wish to do
so, and he need remain identified with one no longer than he may desire; but when
he does unite with a church, and becomes a member of that ecclesiastical body, he
voluntarily surrenders his individual freedom to that extent. So long as he desires
to avail himself of such a relationship, and to enjoy the privileges and benefits
flowing from that association, he must conform to the laws by which it is governed.
Barkley v. Hayes, 208 F. 319, 323 (W.D. Mo. 1913), affld sub nom. Shepard v. Barkley, 247
U.S. 1 (1918); see also Laycock, supra note 2, at 1403 ("If one is ill-treated by his church,
he can leave it; if he feels bound by faith or conscience to stay in, the government can offer
him no remedy.").
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
hierarchical or congregational. For congregational churches, which
recognized no church authority higher than the individual
congregation, federal courts would generally give the property to the
majority faction.4" But for hierarchical churches-those congregations
who accepted the authority of some larger church body-federal
courts had to accept the rulings of that larger church body as
determinative.49 Respecting church autonomy, in other words,
required courts to respect a congregation's earlier commitment to be
bound by a higher church authority."
Watson v. Jones was not initially a constitutional decision-as a
diversity case in 1871, it was decided simply by principles of federal
common law.5 But Watson explained its holding in terms of
constitutional values. It spoke of how its principles were "founded in
a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state."52 In
succeeding cases, the Court adhered to Watson's framework for
48. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724-25 (explaining that in "the case of a church
of a strictly congregational or independent organization ... where there is a schism which
leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the
use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations" and so "[i]f the principle of government in such cases is that the majority
rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the
property").
49. See id. at 726-27 (explaining that in cases where "the local congregation is itself
but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its
government and control ... whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such
decisions as final, and as binding on them").
50. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 614 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing
the Watson rule as requiring that courts "give effect in all cases to the decisions of the
church government agreed upon by the members before the dispute arose"). In Watson
itself, this meant that the federal courts could not quarrel with the General Assembly's
conclusion that the anti-slavery side represented the true church and therefore was the
true owner of the church property. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 734-35.
51. Today a federal court hearing a diversity case like Watson v. Jones would apply
state law. But that was not the approach of federal courts until Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). When Watson v. Jones was decided in 1871, federal
courts applied the rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), whereby they would themselves
create the substantive law that would govern the case. See Swifl 41 U.S. at 19. The
Supreme Court itself later noted that Watson was not initially a constitutional decision. See
Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 110 (1952) ("The [Watson] opinion itself, however, did not turn on either the
establishment or the prohibition of the free exercise of religion.").
52. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727; see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 ("The
[Watson] opinion radiates, however, a spirit of freedom for religious organizations [which
ultimately must be considered] part of the free exercise of religion .... ).
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resolving church-property disputes. 3  And eventually Watson's
principles became constitutional ones. This happened in Kedroff v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North
America." where the Court held that a New York statute allowing
local congregations to split from the Russian Orthodox Church and
keep their property violated the First Amendment.5 Churches now
had a constitutional right to "decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
and doctrine."56 Since Kedrof, the Court has not doubted that church
autonomy is a right of constitutional dimension, 7 although the Court
has tinkered with what that right means in various different
contexts.5"
53. The Supreme Court maintained the distinction it had created between
congregational and hierarchical churches. See Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918)
(applying Watson's principles regarding hierarchical churches to give disputed church
property to the national Presbyterian church over the claims of a local Presbyterian
congregation); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872) (applying
Watson's principles regarding congregational churches to give disputed church property to
a faction representing the majority of the congregation).
54. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
55. Id. at 116 (explaining how Watson's principles "must now be said to have federal
constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference"). Kedroffs holding was extended in a follow-up case involving the same
parties still fighting over the same property. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am., 363 U.S. 190, 191 (1960). Kedroffhad held that New
York could not transfer power from the international Russian Orthodox Church to local
churches by state statute; Kreshik held that New York could not transfer that power
through courts utilizing common-law principles either. See Kreshik, 363 U.S. at 191
(explaining that "whether [the exercised power is] legislative or judicial, it is still the
application of state power" and so "our ruling in Kedroff is controlling" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
56. Kedrof,344 U.S. at 116.
57. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 617 n.4 (1979) ("[B]eginning with [Kedrofl,
this Court has indicated repeatedly that the principles of general federal law announced in
Watson v. Jones are now regarded as rooted in the First Amendment, and are applicable
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("[Tlhe
First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving
church property disputes.").
58. See Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 440 (reversing the decision of a state
court to award church property to the church faction that the court believed was acting
most consistently with church doctrine); Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 (permitting states to "adopt
anyone of various approaches for settling church property disputes" that is consistent with
principles of church autonomy, including an approach based on neutral principles of law
(quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches ofGod v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
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Looking at these church-property cases collectively, people
sometimes refer to them as establishing a sort of "hands-off'
principle, 9 which suggests that courts simply must never intervene in
church disputes.6" This is generally right, but can be a bit misleading-
for sometimes church autonomy may actually require courts to
intervene in internal church disputes. Just consider the facts of an old
case, Bouldin v. Alexander.6  There, a small minority of a
congregational church tried to seize control by locking everyone else
out of the church building and electing new trustees who would then
"own" the property.62 The Supreme Court rightly declared the
election invalid, restored the original trustees, and gave the church
property back to the majority.63 From the hands-off standpoint, this
can appear as an illicit judicial intervention into church affairs-after
all, the Supreme Court just decided an internal church dispute and
issued a judicial order undoing a church election. Indeed, some
people have seen Bouldin precisely this way.' But the judicial
intervention in Bouldin was not inconsistent with proper principles of
church autonomy-it was, in fact, demandedby those same principles.
Like other property rights, rights to church property must be resolved
by the state. Otherwise, we would quickly fall into a Hobbesian-like
59. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-OffApproach to Religious Doctrine: What
Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 845 (2009) (referring to the
"cluster of [church autonomy] cases that seem to illustrate and confirm the hands-off
rule"); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Oft. Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847 (1998) (describing Watson v. Jones as "the origin
of a 'hands-off approach").
60. See, e.g., Joanne C. Brant, "Our Shield Belongs to the Lord".- Religious Employers
and a Constitutional Right to Discrimination, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 299-300
(1994) ("[T~he Court's early church property decisions indicate[d] that courts should not
attempt to resolve 'internal' church disputes."); William Johnson Everett, Ecclesial
Freedom and Federal Order. Reflections on the Pacific Homes Case, 12 J.L. & RELIGION
371, 382 (1995-1996) ("A long series of legal precedents ha[s] confirmed that civil courts
cannot interfere in internal church disputes ... .
61. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
62. Id. at 137-39. Mark Strasser discusses Bouldin at length in one recent article. See
Mark Strasser, When Churches Divide: On Neutrality, Deference, and Unpredictability, 32
HAMLINE L. REV. 427,446-48 (2009).
63. See Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 140 (holding that the original trustees "cannot
be removed from their trusteeship by a minority of the church society or meeting, without
warning, and acting without charges, without citation or trial, and in direct contravention
of the church rules").
64. See Strasser, supra note 62, at 448 ("Arguably, Bouldin stands for the proposition
that although the Court must be deferential in church political matters, that deference is
not absolute.").
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state of nature, where any faction could commandeer church property
so long as it could quickly lock everyone else out of the building.65
Church autonomy is thus a principle of deference, not
abstention. And as Bouldin illustrates, sometimes multiple factions
will each claim to be the true church, and courts will have to decide
which party is "the church" for purposes of deference.66 Watson v.
Jones required courts to defer to the will of the congregation for
congregational churches, and to the will of the hierarchy for
hierarchical churches.67 Jones v. Wolfallowed courts to alternatively
defer to the will of the church as expressed in the secular meanings of
its legal documents.68 The two cases floated different ideas of how to
best discern the will of the church. But both required courts to defer
to that will when clearly expressed.
3. Church Autonomy in the Context of Church-Clergy Disputes
Most of the Court's church autonomy cases have been over
church property. But church-property disputes have occasionally
involved interrelated fights over church personnel. Two Supreme
Court cases are central here and will be important for our study of the
ministerial exception.
The first is a 1929 case: Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop.69 A fourteen-year-old boy, Raul Gonzalez, claimed the
right to a Catholic chaplaincy in the Philippines over the objections of
the Archbishop of Manila. His claim was not as frivolous as it sounds.
A century earlier, a relative of Gonzalez had founded an endowed
chaplaincy in her will. She had specified that the chaplaincy should be
filled, if possible, by her descendants. Most recently, the post had
65. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 726 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that if "civil courts [were] wholly
divested of authority to resolve conflicting claims to real property," then "such claims
[would] be resolved by brute force").
66. See id. at 725 (White, J., concurring) (noting that for the principles of Watson v.
Jones to work, courts at least will have to decide whether the church is hierarchical or
congregational).
67. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
68. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979) ("Through appropriate
reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen
to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will
determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner,
a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of church property
will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members.").
69. 280 U.S. 1(1929).
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW
been filled by Gonzalez's father.7" Yet the Archbishop refused to let
Raul take over the chaplaincy, pointing to 1917 Catholic
requirements that chaplains be priests and have attended seminary
(requirements that Raul obviously did not satisfy).7' Raul pointed out
that no such requirements existed a century ago when the chaplaincy
was established, but the Supreme Court still unanimously ruled in
favor of the Archbishop, stressing that the Catholic Church had the
right to say who was or was not a Catholic chaplain:
[I]t is the function of the church authorities to determine what
the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the
candidate possesses them. In the absence of fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive. 2
The second case is the 1976 case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 73 which involved a schism in the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church. Milivojevich had been the presiding
bishop for the Church in America when the Mother Church (based in
Yugoslavia) removed him and appointed someone else. But
Milivojevich declared his removal invalid and filed suit to stop it.
74
With legal title for all the church property in North America resting
on its resolution, the issue became who truly was the Bishop of the
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church in America.75 An Illinois appellate
court had ordered a trial court hearing on the question.76 But the
Supreme Court held this to be error. Because this was a hierarchical
church, secular courts had to accept the decision of the international
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church back in Yugoslavia. The same
principle for hierarchical churches established in Watson v. Jones for
70. Id. at 12.
71. Id. at 13-14.
72. Id. at 16. The Court resolved the case by implying a condition in the will, which
would allow the Catholic Church to change the requirements for being a chaplain as it
wished. Id. at 16-17.
73. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
74. Id. at 705-07 (describing these facts).
75. Then-Justice Rehnquist humorously framed the question presented in the case as
asking "if the real Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese would please stand up." Id.
at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Ocokoljich, 219 N.E.2d 343, 353 (Ill. App. Ct.
1966).
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church-property cases, the Court explained, "applies with equal force
to church disputes over church polity and church administration." 7
Kedroff, Gonzalez, and Milivojevich together form the backbone
for any defense of the ministerial exception. Through a property case,
Kedroff spoke specifically of a church's right to choose its clergy.
7
1
And Gonzalez and Milivojevich held that this right trumped even
neutral and generally applicable laws. Gonzalez held that the
Catholic Church had a right to choose its chaplains, regardless of the
law of trusts.79 Milivojevich held that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Church had the right to choose its bishops, regardless of the laws of
contract, property, and agency." Together these cases suggest the
possibility that, to the extent employment laws similarly undermine
the rights of churches to select their leaders, they too might be
similarly held unconstitutional.
4. Church Autonomy Meets Employment Law: The Case of Catholic
Bishop
As we have seen, the Supreme Court's church autonomy cases
have arisen in contexts somewhat apart from employment law.
Gonzalez and Milivojevich are certainly closest. Yet there is one
Supreme Court case that does involve the intersection between
church autonomy and employment law: NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago.
s
The controversy in Catholic Bishop arose after the National
Labor Relations Board asserted jurisdiction over Catholic parochial
schools in Chicago and South Bend. The Board ordered union
elections and then deemed it an unfair labor practice when the
77. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 710. The Court added later that "questions of church
discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical
concern" and thus had to be "made by the religious bodies in whose sole discretion the
authority to make those ecclesiastical decisions was vested." Id. at 717-18.
78. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) ("Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation of
the churches, [or] the appointment of clergy ... prohibits the free exercise of religion.").
79. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
80. In his dissent in Milivojevich, Justice Rehnquist stressed that all the lower courts
had done was to apply generally applicable principles. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 726
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the state courts decided the case "just as they
would have attempted to decide a similar dispute among the members of any other
voluntary association").
81. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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Catholic Church refused to bargain with the elected unions.82 The
question became whether the church had a constitutional right to an
exemption from the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). The
Seventh Circuit concluded that it did, holding that the NLRA
unconstitutionally undermined the church's control over its schools
and teachers.83 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that there were
indeed "serious constitutional questions"84 with the Act applying to
Catholic schools, as it imposed deeply on "the freedom of church
authorities to shape and direct teaching in accord with the
requirements of their religion."85 But the Court did not resolve the
constitutional issue, instead interpreting the National Labor Relations
Act not to apply to church schools. In its short nine-page opinion, the
Court relied heavily on the fact that there was no evidence that
Congress consciously intended the NLRA to apply to religious
schools.8 6 By applying the canon of constitutional avoidance to dodge
the issue, the Supreme Court made Catholic Bishop into a mysterious
anomaly. No one knows whether, if push came to shove, the
government could force collective bargaining on Catholic schools.87
All we have are nine Justices cryptically agreeing that the case
presents "difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the
guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses."88
II. CHURCH AUTONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW TOGETHER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, courts began to
develop the constitutional doctrine we now call the ministerial
82. These facts are laid out most clearly in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559
F.2d 1112, 1113-15 (7th Cir. 1977), afld on other grounds, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
83. Id. at 1123 ("The Board's order to bargain unquestionably, in our opinion, inhibits
the bishops' authority to maintain parochial schools in accordance with ecclesiastical
concern.").
84. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501.
85. Id. at 496.
86. Id. at 504 ("Our examination of the statute and its legislative history indicates that
Congress simply gave no consideration to church-operated schools.").
87. Since Catholic Bishop, many courts have considered the issue with regard to state
labor laws and concluded that the government can do so. See Kathleen A. Brady,
Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons ofSmith, 2004 B YU L.
REV. 1633, 1658 & n.156 (2004) (noting how many courts "have gone even further and
upheld the application of state labor laws to lay teachers at church-operated schools" and
providing citations).
88. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507; see also id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that the constitutional questions were difficult, although concluding that the
Court should resolve them).
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exception. Perhaps the most important early case involved Billie
McClure, an ordained minister in the Salvation Army who worked for
the church in a number of capacities.89 She claimed she was fired by
the church for complaining that she got paid less than men in similar
positions.90 Noting that Title VII did not by its own terms exempt
religious organizations from claims of gender discrimination or
retaliation, the Court concluded that the First Amendment required
such an exception. The Court explained its reasoning in a passage
well cited by courts and commentators:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers
is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime
ecclesiastical concern.9'
Over the next thirty years, courts all over the country adopted this
basic conception of the ministerial exception-churches had a
constitutional right to hire and fire the people performing significant
religious duties for them, the employment discrimination laws
notwithstanding. As it stands now, every federal circuit has adopted
some form of the ministerial exception, with the exception of the
Federal Circuit (which has no jurisdiction over such cases). 2 Many
state courts too have recognized the ministerial exception. 3 The early
cases were about race and sex discrimination.94 But courts have now
89. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
90. Id. For more on the facts of McClure, see Brant, supra note 60, at 291-93.
91. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59.
92. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 2007); Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2006); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036,
1039 (7th Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656-57 (10th Cir.
2002); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir.
2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1303 (1 lth
Cir. 2000); Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 349 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir.
1991); Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989).
93. See, e.g., Gunn v. Mariners Church, Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6-8 (Ct. App. 2008);
Rweyemamu v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 911 A.2d 319, 331 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2006); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875
A.2d 669, 675 (D.C. 2005); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 768
N.W.2d 868, 892 (Wis. 2009).
94. See generally Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164 (4th Cir. 1985) (sex and race discrimination); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th
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used the ministerial exception to bar claims under the ADEA, 95 the
ADA, 96 and a host of state statutes.
97
As the ministerial exception has developed doctrinally, it has
become increasingly controversial. The first area of controversy is
simply whether the ministerial exception should exist at all. The
Supreme Court has never heard a ministerial exception case and thus
never really confirmed its existence. Many now argue that the
ministerial exception should simply be abandoned.98
A second area of controversy is over the scope of the ministerial
exception. Assuming it exists, what does the ministerial exception
protect? There are several difficult and interrelated questions here.
First, there is the issue of which types of positions the ministerial
exception properly covers. It surely would include ordained ministers
working in parishes. But churches employ innumerable people in
innumerable types of positions-from janitors to organists, from
school teachers to assistants to the bishop.9 9 Which of these positions
should be considered ministerial? Moreover, when can churches
invoke the ministerial exception? Do they have to have some
religious objection to the anti-discrimination law in question?00 And
does the ministerial exception still apply if the plaintiff is not seeking
reinstatement? One example might be when the plaintiff has been
fired and only seeks damages; another might be when the plaintiff
Cir. 1980) (sex and race discrimination). For a very early and provocative race case, see
generally Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), which involved a
race discrimination suit brought in rural Mississippi by a white Methodist pastor who
claimed he was fired because his wife was black and because he preached racial equality in
the pulpit.
95. See, e.g., Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1041; Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362-63; Minker v. Bait.
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
96. See, e.g., Hollins, 474 F.3d at 227; Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual Conference of
United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004); Starkman v. Evans, 198
F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir. 1999).
97. See Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1134 (Colo. 1996) (Colorado state law
claims); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 766 N.E.2d 820, 827 (Mass. 2002)
(Massachusetts state law claims); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d
513, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (Michigan state law claims); Coulee, 768 N.W.2d at 887
(Wisconsin state law claims).
98. See supra note 6 (providing citations to these sources).
99. Many courts have applied the ministerial exception beyond the paradigmatic
parish priest. See generally Tomic, 442 F.3d 1036 (a church organist); Shaliehsabou v.
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash. Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004) (a Kosher supervisor);
Starkman, 198 F.3d 173 (a church choir director); Scharon, 929 F.2d 360 (a chaplain of
church-affiliated hospital); Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch. of the Archdiocese of
Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (a principal of Catholic school).
100. See supra note 4 (discussing this controversy and providing citations).
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complains of an ongoing hostile work environment but continues to
work for the church. 10'
Finally, a third area of controversy, obviously related to the first
two, is over the justifications for the ministerial exception. What
explains the ministerial exception? Why should churches have the
right to fire people in ways that would be illegal for everyone else?
Courts adopted the ministerial exception almost immediately after
Title VII came into existence, believing that it worked some greater
good. But what modern purposes does this exception serve?
Most ministerial exception articles begin with the doctrinal
questions, exploring the various issues that divide courts and offering
targeted resolutions to particular problems. But one thesis of this
Article is that this may be the wrong way to approach the ministerial
exception. Courts have been answering various doctrinal questions
without a conceptual understanding of what the ministerial exception
aims to do. By working backwards-first breaking apart the
ministerial exception and seeing it for what it is-we can eventually
get a better handle on the doctrinal issues that divide courts.
III. THE RELATIONAL COMPONENT
We start with the first of the three parts of the ministerial
exception-what we shall call the relational component. Though it
may be the most essential to religious freedom, this part of the
ministerial exception usually goes unnoticed. Like the larger part of
the iceberg which lies unseen below the surface of the water, this right
is rarely discussed and almost never litigated. The relational
component-which also could be called the associational
component-involves the right of religious organizations to
discriminate in hiring on the basis of religion (not on the basis of any
other characteristic). Although the relational component will overlap
significantly with the other parts of the ministerial exception, it is
unique in very important respects. So it is essential for conceptual
clarity that we locate this right, explain its importance, and properly
define its scope.
We begin with a fact that might strike readers as all too obvious.
Organizations founded on shared religious principles cannot really
exist unless they actually share religious principles. Nothing,
therefore, is more at the heart of a religious organization's freedom
101. See supra note 5 (discussing this controversy and providing citations).
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than the right to choose its staff on a religious basis. Without that
right, religious organizations would lose their distinctive character
almost immediately. Having to hire Protestants, the Catholic Church
could not stay distinctively Catholic; having to hire Christians,
Orthodox Judaism could not stay distinctively Jewish (let alone
Orthodox). Churches are corporate entities. But, in an important
sense, corporate entities are just fictions. To the extent corporate
personalities exist, they flow largely from the personalities of the
people who make them up. But if we call a church Baptist because it
is made up of Baptists, what it means is that a church's right to
religiously discriminate in membership and staff is nothing less than
its bare right to exist. This is true for all types of organizations, of
course, not just religious ones. A group of people selected at random,
without any regard to their views about the environment, would make
a terrible environmental advocacy organization. Were that legally
required of the Sierra Club, it could never accomplish anything.
Applying the religious-discrimination laws to religious groups
therefore seems like a categorical mistake. Religious organizations
are religious discrimination: A Catholic parish only stays Catholic
because of numerous, ongoing acts of intentional discrimination on
everyone's part. Protestants generally choose not to attend there;
Catholics prefer it that way. Protestant ministers generally do not
apply to work there; the Catholic hierarchy would reject their
applications if they did. And this is true everywhere. Congregants,
ministers, congregations, and denominations only find each other
through a process of religious sorting that is legally indistinguishable
from religious discrimination.
Outside of a few atypical contexts, controversies over the right of
religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion have
not really developed." 2 We might expect such disputes to arise from
102. The issue arises most frequently in the context of government subsidies-that is,
when government subsidizes religious organizations that discriminate on the basis of
religion, it can seem like the government itself is discriminating on the basis of religion.
This can become quite controversial, although it may be more about the line between state
and private action and less about the appropriateness of religious organizations engaging
in religious discrimination. In 2010, though the Court itself did not get to this exact issue,
several Justices offered differing opinions on whether religious groups could be denied
access to government property because they discriminate on the basis of religion.
Compare Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2996 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that religious groups can legitimately be denied access to government
property), with id. at 3010-11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that they cannot). For a
thoughtful take on this issue, see John D. Inazu, The Unsettling "Well-Settled" Law of
Freedom ofAssociation, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149,154 & n.14, 155,206 (2010).
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Title VII, given that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in
employment. We might expect to see cases delineating the
constitutional protections that religious organizations have from
claims of religious discrimination-cases that we could use to flesh
out the meaning of the relational component. But those cases do not
arise for a very simple reason, which is that Title VII flatly exempts
religious organizations from that prohibition:
This subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such
corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its
activities. °3
The Supreme Court unanimously approved the constitutionality of
this exemption in Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,"' a case we
will return to later. But this explains why the constitutional rights of
religious organizations to religiously discriminate are not litigated.
They do not come up because they are not threatened.
Yet this is changing. It is changing principally because of state
and local anti-discrimination laws. 5 In some ways, state and local
anti-discrimination laws are now significantly more powerful than
federal laws like Title VII. Title VII caps damages at certain
amounts, 0 6 but state and local laws often do not. 7 Title VII does not
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006). There is another religious exception in Title VII
specifically for church-owned schools. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2006). There is also
an allowance for religious discrimination (even for nonreligious employers) when it
constitutes a "bona fide occupational qualification." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2006); see
also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text (discussing the BFOQ provision).
104. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
105. See Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track . 7 Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV.
469, 476 (2006) ("Although numerous states had employment discrimination statutes on
the books prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress's decision to
outlaw discrimination in the workplace prompted more states to enact similar statutes and
to expand upon the protection afforded under existing state statutes.").
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (2006) (capping Title VII damages from $50,000 to
$300,000, depending on the size of the employer).
107. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L.
REV. 97, 156 (2009) (noting, with citations, how "many states provide uncapped
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional employment discrimination (or they
provide caps higher than those in the federal law)"); Catherine M. Sharkey, Dissecting
Damages: An Empirical Exploration of Sexual Harassment Awards, 3 J. EMPIRICAL
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apply to employers with less than fifteen employees, 0 8 but state and
local laws often do. 1°9 The almost universal view is that Title VII does
not impose personal liability (that is, liability on discriminators as
individuals rather than on the corporations that employ them), I10 but
state and local laws frequently do."' Giving more in damages and
imposing liability more often, state and local anti-discrimination laws
may represent the future of employment discrimination litigation.
1 2
Title VII exempts religious employers from claims of religious
discrimination under Title VII. But it does not protect religious
employers from state and local laws."3 And state and local laws often
treat religious organizations like any other corporation. Connecticut,
Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio all
forbid religious discrimination in employment across the board
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5 (2006) (discussing how, in practice, Title VII damage caps have
become irrelevant in sexual harassment cases because of state law causes of action).
108. See Hirsch, supra note 30, at 1066 (noting that Title VII and the ADA apply only
to employers with fifteen or more full-time employees while the ADEA applies only to
those with twenty or more).
109. See Sandra F. Sperino, Recreating Diversity in EmploymentLa w byDebunking the
Myth of the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUS. L. REv. 349, 355 n.20 (2007)
(providing citations to many state employment discrimination laws and noting that, with
one exception, they either have a smaller numerical threshold than Title VII or no
numerical threshold at all).
110. See Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding so
and providing voluminous citations). But see Jan W. Henkel, Discrimination by
Supervisors: Personal Liability Under Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 49
FLA. L. REv. 767, 768 & n.4 (1997) (pointing out the few isolated cases which have
imposed liability on individual supervisors).
111. See Jill Jensen-Welch, Suing the Bastard Boss: Personal Liability of Supervisors for
Workplace Sexual Harassment 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 466, 472-81 (2002) (chronicling the
employment discrimination laws of all fifty states and examining which provide for
individual liability on the part of supervisors and concluding that the states are relatively
split and that "no majority rule emerges from an analysis of state laws and supervisor
liability for employment discrimination").
112. See generally Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation
Claims in a Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253 (2010)
(arguing for more use of state law to combat discrimination); Sperino, supra note 109
(same).
113. Title VII does not preempt state law in this sense. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006)
("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter."); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 (1983) ("[T]itle VII does not
itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws to areas not covered by
Title VII . . .")
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without any special exemption for religious organizations." 4 At least
some city and county ordinances (which are far harder to track) do
the same." 5 Under the laws as written in all of these jurisdictions,
religious groups cannot hire (or even prefer) members of their own
faith. Catholic schools must give equal consideration to atheistic
teachers, and Jewish temples must give equal consideration to
Presbyterian cantors. Indeed, the way these laws are written, they do
technically forbid Baptist churches from requiring that their ministers
be Baptist."6 There is, unsurprisingly, widespread noncompliance
with these laws. But that just means that religious organizations in
these places are operating outside the law and can be shut down at
will."7
Some now argue that the ministerial exception simply should not
exist."' These laws offer the best practical proof of why some
constitutional protection here is necessary. Otherwise, churches will
exist only at the sufferance of government-any hostile government
could choose to destroy them by simply passing a generally applicable
religious discrimination law and then making no exception for
religious groups. Under any system committed to religious liberty to
any degree, this sort of relational component must exist.
114. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a) (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West 2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 143-422.2 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.02 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). A helpful table of state employment discrimination
laws as they apply to religious organizations can be found in 1 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W.
COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 9:37 (2011).
115. See generally Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A,2d 111 (Md. 2001)
(involving a case brought against a Christian school for religious discrimination under the
Montgomery County Code).
116. So far, the most flagrant conflicts have not developed. Catholic priests have not
sued Baptist churches, most likely because Catholic priests do not want to be Baptist
ministers. And it probably never even occurs to them that they might have a legal right to
force themselves on unwilling Baptist congregations. But there already have been some
cases where religious organizations have been sued under state and local religious-
discrimination laws by people of other religions. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying
text.
117. To be sure, some of the state laws discussed above have BFOQ provisions that
religious organizations might use to defend their right to use religion as a criterion in
hiring. But, as we said, BFOQs are interpreted narrowly. See supra notes 25-29 and
accompanying text. And at least some states do not have BFOQs either. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2009) (forbidding religious discrimination across the board with
no exception for religious organizations and no BFOQs).
118. See infra Part VI (explaining this objection).
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And indeed, the Court has hinted at the constitutional nature of
the relational component, although in a muted and uncertain way.
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos." 9 The lead plaintiff in Amos was a janitor
at a Mormon gymnasium who had been fired by the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints ("Mormon Church") for failing to qualify
for a temple recommend--essentially for failing to be a good
Mormon in the eyes of the Mormon Church. He sued the Church for
religious discrimination under Title VII. While Title VII exempts
religious organizations from the prohibition on religious
discrimination, the plaintiff claimed that the exemption itself violated
the Establishment Clause.
These days Amos is known for its unanimous rejection of the
Establishment Clause claim. But, for our purposes, what is more
important is how Amos assumed that the First Amendment would
actually require some sort of exemption for religious organizations-
Amos recognized, in other words, the constitutional dimensions of the
relational component. Amos left the details profoundly unclear.
Amos seemed to suggest that religious organizations would have
constitutional rights to use religion as a criterion in hiring with regard
to at least some employees (those with religious work duties). But this
is all admittedly guesswork; Amos certainly did not resolve the
point. 2'
In deciding on the breadth of the relational component, the key
is that it should be broader than the other parts of the ministerial
exception. The ministerial exception currently works like this:
Churches are completely immune from all claims of discrimination
regarding "ministers" (however defined), but they have no immunity
119. 483 U.S. 327(1987).
120. To fully understand Amos's logic, some chronology becomes important. As it was
originally passed in 1964, Title VII only exempted religious groups from claims of religious
discrimination brought by employees who did work connected to the group's religious
activities. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-I (2006)). In 1972, Congress expanded the exemption, immunizing religious
organizations from all claims of religious discrimination, regardless of the plaintiff's job
duties. SeePub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
1 (2006)). In Amos, the Court seemed to assume that the Free Exercise Clause at least
required the exemption as it was originally enacted in 1964. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336
("We may assume for the sake of argument that the pre-1972 exemption was adequate in
the sense that the Free Exercise Clause required no more."). The Court refused to say
whether the broader exemption established in 1972 was constitutionally required. See id.
at 339 n.17 ("We have no occasion to pass on the argument ... that the exemption to
which they are entitled under § 702 is required by the Free Exercise Clause.").
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from claims brought by non-ministers (however defined).12' The
church's right to discriminate on the basis of religion is thus
coextensive with its right to discriminate on the basis of things like
age, sex, and disability. But this makes little sense. Any lay person
would think it obvious that religious organizations should have a
broader ability to discriminate on the basis of religion than on the
basis of other criteria--churches should be able to use religion as a
criteria in hiring for particular positions where they would not be able
to use, say, race.
We see the harmful consequences of this sort of thinking in cases
like Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo."' Porth was
working as an elementary school teacher at a Catholic school when
the school changed its policy regarding non-Catholic teachers.
Wanting to strengthen its Catholic identity, it chose to re-hire only
the Catholic teachers. Porth brought suit claiming illegal religious
discrimination under Michigan law, which bars religious
discrimination without making any exemption for religious
organizations. 23 The court assumed that the ministerial exception
would not apply. 24 But in making that assumption, the court relied
solely on cases of sex and race discrimination. 125 The court's implicit
logic was that a Catholic school should only have the right to use
religion as a criterion in positions where it could also use race and sex
as criteria. Cases like Porth are precisely why we should recognize the
relational component as distinct from the other parts of the
ministerial exception. 26
Though we cannot expect agreement on the precise reach of the
relational component, this Article argues that it should be given quite
broad scope. Religious organizations should have control over their
religious identity. Porth should be an easy case. A case like Montrose
Christian School v. Walsh 27 should be similarly easy. In Walsh, the
121. This conceptual dichotomy runs through all ministerial exception cases. For some
prominent ones, see supra notes 92-97 (providing citations to various types of ministerial
exception cases).
122. 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
123. SeeMICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102(1) (West 2001).
124. SeePorth,532N.W.2dat 197 n.1.
125. See id. at 195-96, 197 & n.1, 198, 199 & n.2,200.
126. Ultimately, Porth was won under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"). See id. at 197. Given that RFRA was invalidated with respect to state law by
the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), if a religious
organization were to win cases like Porth today, it would have to be under the ministerial
exception.
127. 770 A.2d 111 (Md. 2001).
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Montrose Baptist Church ran a Baptist school. When a new pastor
came on board, he wanted to employ only members of the
congregation as teachers (or, if that was impossible, only Baptists).
Several non-Baptists brought suit under the Montgomery County
Code, the applicable county law. 128
Churches should win these sorts of cases. Many churches have
religious schools. Sometimes those schools become less religious over
time. But that freedom has to go both ways-religious schools should
also have the right to become more religious if they so choose. And,
of course, these two cases are just the tip of the iceberg. If religious
groups were truly bound by the prohibition on religious
discrimination, they would have to hire people utterly inconsistent
with their mission and utterly opposed to their values. Such a
prohibition makes sense for nonreligious employers. Wal-Mart should
treat atheists like Catholics; Wal-Mart should treat atheists who
impugn Catholicism the same way it treats Catholics who impugn
atheism. But it makes little sense for the law to require that of the
Catholic Church. The Catholic Church should not have to hire people
who openly reject Catholicism as patriarchal and oppressive. It should
not even have to hire people lukewarm about Catholicism. Moreover,
even when churches hire outsiders, they often would prefer their own
members to run their institutions. Catholic schools, for example, give
preferences to hiring Catholic priests and Catholic nuns.129 That
would be impossible in a system of religion-blind hiring.
In finishing with the relational component, it is important to
stress how it differs from the other parts of the ministerial exception.
While it certainly overlaps with the autonomy component and the
conscience component, the overlap is imprecise; the relational
component clearly covers things that the other two do not. First off,
we have already seen how the relational component differs from the
autonomy component. The autonomy component, as we shall discuss
later, should bar all claims brought by people in high-ranking
positions (i.e., ministers). The relational component gives churches
greater ability to fire people based on religion. Prevailing doctrine
ignores the relational component completely, subsuming it within the
128. Id. at 117-18.
129. The Supreme Court has recognized such preferences as ordinary and perfectly
appropriate. SeeLemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1971) (noting that "the role of
teaching nuns in enhancing the religious atmosphere has led the parochial school
authorities to attempt to maintain a one-to-one ratio between nuns and lay teachers in all
schools rather than to permit some to be staffed almost entirely by lay teachers").
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autonomy component. But this is problematic. Indeed, Amos
provides a great final example of how the two differ. The Court in
Amos stressed how the janitor plaintiff had absolutely no religious
duties-he was not a minister under any conception of the term.
130
Had he been bringing a race discrimination suit, his claim could have
proceeded. But because he was bringing a religious discrimination
suit, his claim was barred. The facts of Amosthus nicely illustrate how
the relational component should apply even in situations where the
autonomy component does not.
Moreover, the relational component also differs from the
conscience component. The relational component immunizes
churches from claims of religious discrimination even when the
church does not make any claim of conscience. Again Amos itself is
such a case. The Supreme Court took special pains to point out that
"no contention was made that the religious doctrines of the Mormon
Church ... require religious discrimination in employment." 131 Porth
and Walsh too are such cases. The Catholic school in Porth wanted its
teachers to be Catholic, but it did not believe itself religiously
forbidden from ever hiring Protestants. At bottom, the relational
component may overlap deeply with the other components, but it
protects something somewhat unique and distinct.
IV. THE CONSCIENCE COMPONENT
We now turn to the conscience component, which is probably the
most conspicuous part of the ministerial exception. As soon as one
hears that Title VII forbids sex discrimination but makes no
exception for churches, one instinctively thinks of the Catholic
Church's commitment to having a male-only priesthood. In this
section, we explore the conscience component, a small but vital part
of the thing we call the ministerial exception.
We start with a preliminary note. If we conceive of the
ministerial exception as being entirely about claims of religious
conscience, it will be quite narrow indeed. Most employment
discrimination laws create no problems of conscience. Few churches
have ever been religiously committed to age or disability
130. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 332 (1987) ("None of [the plaintiffs] duties at the Gymnasium are 'even
tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the Mormon Church or
church administration.'" (quoting Amos v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Latter-Day Saints, 594 F. Supp. 791, 802 (D. Utah 1984))).
131. Id. at 332 n.7 (citation omitted).
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discrimination. Nowadays churches take firm stances opposing such
things. 32 One early ministerial exception case involved a conscience
claim relating to race-a rural Mississippi church fired its white pastor
for violating church doctrine by being married to a black woman.133
But such cases now thankfully seem like relics from another century,
if not another planet. And if the race issue ever arises again, it may
well be on the other side of the aisle: Historically black churches have
had an important role in this country's moral and political
development, but the very label suggests lawsuits.
13 4
The largest conscience problem, of course, arises over issues of
sex and gender. 3 ' Many religious institutions do not ordain women,
including Orthodox Judaism; the Greek Orthodox Church; the
Catholic Church; some Islamic denominations; and some Lutheran,
Baptist, and Presbyterian denominations. The specifics vary, but they
all see clerical positions as intended by God to be filled by men alone.
Consider the Catholic Church's position:
Priestly ordination, which hands on the office entrusted by
Christ to his Apostles of teaching, sanctifying and governing the
faithful, has in the Catholic Church from the beginning always
been reserved to men alone.... These reasons include: the
example recorded in the Sacred Scriptures of Christ choosing
his Apostles only from among men; the constant practice of the
Church, which has imitated Christ in choosing only men; and
132. See, e.g., UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE BOOK OF DISCIPLINE OF THE
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH 430 (L. Fitzgerald Reist et al. eds., 2008)
("[A]ppointments are made without regard to race, ethnic origin, gender, color, disability,
marital status or age, except for the provisions of mandatory retirement.").
133. The pastor brought a race discrimination suit under Title VII, arguing that he was
fired both because of his interracial marriage and because he preached race equality from
the pulpit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the claim pursuant to the ministerial exception. See
Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 494 (5th Cir. 1974).
134. This point will also be addressed later, when this Article discusses the potential for
large-scale class action lawsuits to be brought against churches. See infra Part V.B.
135. Sexual orientation will be a future issue here. Although no federal law currently
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, Congress will likely pass an employment
discrimination law protecting gays and lesbians. The introduced bills thus far have
completely exempted religious organizations. See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination
Act of 2009 ("ENDA"), H.R. 3017, 11 lth Cong. § 6 (1st Sess. 2009); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y
274, 304 n.135 (2010) (discussing the ramifications of the proposed bill).
The sexual orientation issue has already arisen with state and local laws that bar
sexual orientation discrimination without exempting churches. See, e.g., Thorson v. Billy
Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 687 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding a
religious organization statutorily exempt from claims filed under a Minnesota statute
forbidding discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment).
[Vol. 90
2011] INDEFENSE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 33
her living teaching authority which has consistently held that
the exclusion of women from the priesthood is in accordance
with God's plan for his Church.'36
The conscience component recognizes that Catholics should be
allowed to follow God's will as they perceive it, regardless of whether
they perceive that will rightly, regardless of whether that will exists,
and regardless of whether such a thing as God even exists. In recent
years, some have suggested that perhaps the law should not
accommodate illiberal religions like this' 3 -perhaps the government
should simply break the patriarchy of the Catholic Church, forcing it
either to ordain women or disappear. But such views do not yet seem
widespread.'
Much time could be spent discussing the nature of the conscience
component, exhaustively discussing the reasons why churches should
have the right to follow their own beliefs. But this ground has been
covered innumerable times. Over the past forty years, the Supreme
Court has heard a host of cases involving conflicts between religious
conscience and government policy--Christians who object to paying
social security taxes, 9 Muslims who insist on attending Friday
services, 4 and Orthodox Jews who want to wear yarmulkes.14' The
entire modern history of the Free Exercise Clause has been over what
136. Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, On Reserving Priestly
Ordination to Men Alone, in FROM "INTER INSIGNIORES" TO "ORDINATIO
SACERDOTALIS": DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 185, 185 (L'Osservatore Romano
trans., 1998) [hereinafter ORDINATIO SACERDOTALIS], availableathttp://www.vatican.va
/holyfather/john_paul ii/apost_letters/documents/hfjp-ii apl22051994_ordinatio-
sacerdotalis-en.html.
137. See, eg., Brant, supra note 60, at 290, 291 & n.83; Jane Rutherford, Equality as the
Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to
Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1088-91 (1996); Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of
Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community and Women's Equality, 10 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 526-28 (2004).
138. See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2007)
("[H]ardly anyone thinks that government should compel Catholics to ordain female
priests .. "). Many people feel like Martha Nussbaum, who disagrees with the views of
these churches, but is willing to let them live as their values dictate. See Martha C.
Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in Is MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?: SUSAN
MOLLER OKIN WITH RESPONDENTS 105, 114 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) ("I don't
like the idea of an all-male priesthood any more than Okin does. Nor do I like many of the
practices of Orthodox Judaism with respect to sex equality. That is why I am a Reform
Jew.").
139. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982) (involving such a claim).
140. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987) (involving such a
claim).
141. SeeGoldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (involving such a claim).
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courts should do when religious conscience clashes with legal
obligation.'42 Countless articles have been written on the subject.
43
But there is a second reason not to go on and on about the
conscience component-one deeply tied to the claims of this Article.
A thesis of this Article is that courts and commentators have been
wrong to limit the ministerial exception to the idea of religious
conscience. Some of the strongest reasons for exempting religious
organizations from the anti-discrimination laws have nothing to do
with conscience at all. We saw this with the relational component, but
it will be even clearer with the autonomy component: Even when
churches agree with the employment discrimination principles in
question, there are good reasons to exempt them.
One final point remains to be made here, which deals with the
overlap between the relational component and the conscience
component. Imagine the Catholic Church decides that the male-only
ordination policy is so important that all priests must agree with it to
become ordained. This is, in fact, the natural first reading of the
Church's position, though apparently not its practice.'" In this way, a
conscience claim now becomes a relational claim. By refusing to
ordain anyone (male or female) who disagrees with its religious policy
of a male-only priesthood, the Church has turned a case of sex
discrimination into a case of religious discrimination. All this goes to
show how twisted up these various components are and how difficult
it is to disentangle them.
142. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uni5o Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
423 (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997); Church of the Lukumi
Balbalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 528 (1993); Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 698 (1989); Frazee
v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 830 (1989); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 144 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 291-92 (1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
709 (1981).
143. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 628 n.4
(2003) (providing citations to several of the most important works).
144. Ordinatio Sacerdotalis ends by concluding, "I declare that the Church has no
authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this judgment is to
be definitively held by all the Church's faithful." ORDINATIO SACERDOTALIS, supra note
136, at 191.
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V. THE AUTONOMY COMPONENT (THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
SIMPLIC1TER)
We now turn to the third part of the ministerial exception, the
autonomy component. Here we consider the claim that for a certain
range of positions-leadership positions, "ministerial" positions,
positions with significant religious duties, positions with religious
significance-the government should be flatly barred from interfering
with the church's decisions. This issue lies at the heart of the
ministerial exception, makes up the bulk of ministerial exception
cases, and is now before the Supreme Court in the fall 2011 term. As
such, this Article takes a sustained look at this part of the ministerial
exception.
While the relational component deals with the special nature of
religious discrimination, and while the conscience component deals
with the special issues of religious conscience, the autonomy
component deals with the special importance of religious leaders in
religious life. Choosing a minister is an important act of religious
exercise. Religious leaders play fundamental roles in peoples' lives.
They bury our parents; they marry us; they care for us when we are
dying, sick, or depressed; they baptize and confirm our children. That
is not true for everyone, of course. But it is true for religious believers
of all stripes-and for them, it is particularly true. And so because
selecting a minister is at the heart of religion, the heart of religious
freedom lies in having free choice in making that selection.
Conversely, imposing liability on people because of whom they
want (or do not want) as their minister burdens that freedom. The
Court has wrestled most deeply with these problems in the context of
the Free Speech Clause. And there the Court's rule has been both
clear and forceful: Liability presumptively cannot attach to speech on
important matters-matters of public concern.145 A similar rule
should apply here. Liability presumptively should not attach to
religiously important matters-matters of significant religious
concern. Hiring a groundskeeper may not be a matter of significant
religious concern, but hiring a minister surely is. As a result, a
congregation's decision to hire someone as a minister should
therefore be protected and immune from liability, whether we are
145. SeeSnyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-17 (2011) (reversing a jury verdict that
found against a group who picketed a military funeral); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (reversing a jury verdict against a magazine that ran an incendiary
advertisement).
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talking about liability under common law principles of tort or under
statutorily created ones like the employment discrimination laws.
This point has gotten lost in the debate precisely because so
many have thought of the ministerial exception strictly in terms of
conscience.146 Some think that religious groups should perhaps be
exempt from anti-discrimination laws to which they have some
religious objection, but they should not be exempt otherwise. The
Catholic Church could use the ministerial exception to shield its
priesthood from claims of sex discrimination but not from claims of
age discrimination. Caroline Corbin says this:
In other words, for churches that do not claim that their tenets
require discrimination, a decision influenced by discrimination
is a mistake (or worse) from the church's point of view, and the
state is merely requiring the church to fix it.
147
This view has spread in the courts, particularly due to one highly
influential Third Circuit opinion, which held that "the ministerial
exception [does] not bar Title VII claims by ministerial employees
when an employment decision is not motivated by religious belief,
religious doctrine, or church regulation." '148 Thus, unless God
commands disobedience from the anti-discrimination law in question,
there is no proper basis for a religious exemption from it.
There are two issues with this. First, it labors under the old
troublesome view that equates religious exercise with the following of
commands-the idea being that if the law's requirements do not
contradict any of God's commands, then there is no significant
burden on religious exercise. But this is not right. Religion is more
146. See supra Part IV.
147. Corbin, supra note 6, at 2023; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 129
(pointing out the argument about how anti-discrimination laws might simply help churches
to "reinforce their [own] pre-commitments about hiring").
148. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir.), withdrawn upon grant of reh g,
462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), available at 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *28. The
prominent and thoughtful judge, Edward Becker, continued this way:
The Constitution protects religious exercise, and we decline to turn the Free
Exercise Clause into a license for the free exercise of discrimination unmoored
from religious principle. We therefore conclude that under the Free Exercise
Clause the ministerial exception will not bar Title VII claims by ministerial
employees when an employment decision is not motivated by religious belief,
religious doctrine, or church regulation.
Id. After Judge Becker passed away, the case was reheard and a different panel rejected
his approach. For more detail on this point, see supra note 4.
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than just obeying commands. God might not demand that you sing in
the church choir or go to church on Sunday rather than Tuesday. But
those things are surely religious exercise. And were the government
to start forbidding church choirs or Sunday worship, it would just as
surely burden the free exercise of religion. This is why the Supreme
Court protects acts that are religiously motivated, even when not
religiously compelled.'49 Thus, because choosing a minister is a
religiously motivated decision, it should not generally be the basis for
liability, regardless of whether the church happens to agree or
disagree with the anti-discrimination law in question. One could say,
of course, that if the church agrees with the anti-discrimination law,
any burden the law imposes is not really a burden on religious
exercise. But you cannot break the decision-making process apart like
that. Choosing a minister does not become a secular act because a
church uses criteria it pledged not to use.
The second problem is more subtle. Many churches believe that
their selection of a certain person as a minister (and not another) is
something commanded by God-not in the sense that God has
commanded disobedience from an anti-discrimination law, but in the
sense that God has commanded that a specific person be hired (or not
hired) for the job. Indeed, many churches (like the Lutheran church
in Hosanna-Tabor) do not see themselves as choosing ministers at all.
God calls ministers and God ends their calls; God decides who is fit
and who is not. Congregations merely try to discern when God has
called someone and when God has ended their call. 50 This is not the
worldview of many people nowadays. But within this worldview,
every decision about who is a minister is religiously compelled. Every
149. To give but one example, the Native American practitioners in Employment
Division v. Smith may not have been religiously required to use peyote, but their use of
peyote was still the exercise of religion-and that later point was the only one that the
Supreme Court thought relevant. SeeEmp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 877 (1990) (describing the exercise of religion as involving "acts or abstentions ...
[that] are engaged in for religious reasons"); id. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("conduct motivated by sincere religious belief'); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972) ("rooted in religious belief'); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)
("following the precepts of [one's] religion").
150. This is the view of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, the religious
denomination running the school in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. For a fuller discussion of
their views on this issue, see Brief of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2-7, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (U.S. June
20, 2011), 2011 WL 2470848, at *2-7.
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decision about who is a minister is "motivated by religious belief
[and] religious doctrine."15'
Having laid out this quite general case for a blanket ministerial
exception, we now turn to some specific isolated problems that anti-
discrimination laws can create for religious organizations. In
particular, this section explains how there are four discrete problems
with allowing suits brought by ministers to go forward against their
churches. These four problems are the reinstatement problem, the
restructuring problem, the control problem, and the inquiry problem.
Together these variegated concerns push toward an overarching and
categorical rule exempting religious institutions from anti-
discrimination claims brought by their ministers.
A. The Reinstatement Problem
We start with the reinstatement problem. In most employment
discrimination cases, a plaintiff alleges that she should not have been
fired and that she has a legal right to be placed back into her old
position. But having courts forcibly reinstate ministers raises deep
religious liberty problems, and other alternatives are similarly
problematic. In this section, we explore these difficulties, which we
shall collectively label the reinstatement problem.
Courts frequently say that the preferred remedy in successful
employment discrimination cases is reinstatement.'52 In the context of
ministerial employment, this means returning a minister to his or her
old position within the church, despite the wishes of the church
hierarchy or the congregation. This creates a religious liberty problem
with both free exercise and disestablishment dimensions. To take the
latter first, an essential part of the old established churches was that
the government appointed and controlled the clergy. Consider the
Anglican establishment in England-the quintessential religious
establishment for the framers of our Constitution. It came about in
large part because Henry VIII wanted a religious divorce. The Pope
was unwilling and Henry had trouble securing support for it from the
English clergy. By establishing the Anglican Church, Henry VIII gave
151. Petruska, 2006 U.S. App. LEXISat *28.
152. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006) (authorizing courts to order
"reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate"); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting that "the presumptively appropriate remedy in a Title VII action is
reinstatement" and citing a number of cases on that point).
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himself total control to choose the bishops that he wanted,
empowering himself while simultaneously undermining Rome.'53
Among the American colonies with established churches,
governmental control over the clergy was a key theme as well. In the
American colonies with an Anglican establishment, the King
appointed all the clergy. In the American colonies with a
Congregational establishment, the voters elected the clergy.54
Michael McConnell has made a list of the elements of an established
church-government control over the clergy is at the top of the list.'55
It has taken centuries for the idea to take hold that churches
themselves-that is, the congregation and its officials chosen to lead
it-should be the ones choosing clergy. When the government
reinstates a plaintiff to a ministerial position through the anti-
discrimination laws, that control is undermined.
Any lay person can imagine the serious burden that is placed on
churches and congregations who would have to accept a minister
whose spiritual authority they reject. Week after week, churches will
have to get by with a minister they do not want and that they do not
believe God wants them to have. We have rules barring the
government from interfering when people choose lawyers.5 6 We have
rules barring the government from interfering when people choose
spouses-a lesson from Loving v. Virginia157 now being repeated in
the same-sex marriage cases.'58 Denying people freedom to choose
153. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE,
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 134-40 (1997).
154. See Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 G EO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253,
262 (2009).
155. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding,
Part I. Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2132 (2003) ("The two
principal means of government control over the church were laws governing doctrine and
the power to appoint prelates and clergy.").
156. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (explaining that the
"Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice" entitles a defendant to "be defended by the
counsel he believes to be best"); see also Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill.
1991) ("Generally, a client may discharge his attorney at any time, with or without
cause."); David B. Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some
Lessons from the Diversity Wars, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855, 878 n.86 (1998) ("The
traditional view is that clients have an unqualified right to fire their attorneys for any
reason, even reasons that violate public policy.").
157. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
158. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving a
challenge to a California citizen initiative prohibiting same-sex marriages); Citizens for
Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 863 (8th Cir. 2006) (involving a challenge to a
Nebraska constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriages).
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their minister denies them a similar kind of freedom of intimate
association. Of course, church members who reject the authority of
the reappointed minister can always leave the church. But that too
comes with consequences. Religious people do not see churches as
fungible. And religious minorities will often have no good
alternatives.
Many of the cases, including Hosanna-Tabor, involve plaintiffs
demanding reinstatement back into the church that did not want
them. 159 But courts have flexibility here. Instead of reinstatement,
they can give monetary relief--ordering front pay for the years that
the plaintiff would have worked rather than reinstatement for the
plaintiff to actually work those years. 160 Some suggest this as a
solution to the reinstatement problem. 6' It is an interesting argument.
One could draw a nice analogy from the specific performance cases,
where courts refuse to order specific performance in the case of
personal service contracts but still allow monetary claims. 162
But giving front pay in lieu of reinstatement does not really fix
the core problem. It still gives the government control over the
church's clergy, just in a different way: Appoint this minister or pay a
fine. If there is a religious liberty problem here, it is not fixed by
taxing religious exercise instead of prohibiting it. Giving monetary
relief in lieu of reinstatement is also a strange sort of compromise,
inconsistent with intuition and without foundation in precedent.
Consider Gonzalez, the case about the fourteen-year-old boy who
wanted to become a Catholic chaplain with the right to the money in
the chaplaincy's endowment. It would have made no sense to deny
159. See Belcove-Shalin, supra note 22, at 149-52 (noting that about half of ministerial
exception cases involve requests for reinstatement).
160. See, e.g., Pollard v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 850 (2001)
("Courts recognized that reinstatement was not always a viable option, and that an award
of front pay as a substitute for reinstatement in such cases was a necessary part of the
'make whole' relief mandated by Congress .... "); see also Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc.,
239 F.3d 848, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that reinstatement may become "particularly
infeasible if the plaintiff would no longer enjoy the confidence and respect of his superiors
once reinstated" or "when the plaintiff holds a management position or would be
supervised by the same individuals who discriminated against him in the first place"
(citation omitted)).
161. See Corbin, supra note 6, at 2025 ("[C]ourts can always limit plaintiffs recovery to
monetary relief."); Rutherford, supra note 137, at 1125-26 (making the same point).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) (stating that "[a]
promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced"). The classic case here
is Lumleyv. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 689-90; 1 De G. M. & G. 604,607-12.
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him the position of chaplain but still give him the money in the
endowment. The Court thought this point obvious.163
The amount of front pay awarded in these cases can be quite
substantial. To be sure, courts have discretion over how much front
pay to award. 164 But the theory is that front pay should perfectly
substitute for reinstatement 65 -- courts are supposed to calculate the
precise amount of money so as to put the plaintiff "in the identical
financial position that he would have occupied had he been
reinstated."'' 66 Under this theory, many courts hold that plaintiffs are
presumptively entitled to front pay up to their retirement age 167
sometimes beyond their retirement age.161 Front pay awards of ten
years of salary (and benefits and pension) are common. 169 Awards of
more than twenty years are not out of the question. 7 ° Of course,
163. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 19 (1929)
("Since Raul is not entitled to be appointed chaplain, he is not entitled to a living from the
income of the chaplaincy."). For more on Gonzalez, see supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
164. See Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve
Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the
"Rational Actor," 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 224 (2009) ("Courts already have wide
discretion as to the duration of front pay awarded .... Those discretionary choices are
rarely reversed under the deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard of review.").
165. See Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846 (explaining how "front pay [acts] as a substitute for
reinstatement").
166. Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Avita v.
Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also Williams v.
Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "front pay is the
functional equivalent of reinstatement because it is a substitute remedy that affords the
plaintiff the same benefit (or as close an approximation as possible) as the plaintiff would
have received had she been reinstated").
167. See, e.g., Luca v. Cnty. of Nassau, 344 Fed. App'x. 637, 641 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We
have repeatedly upheld awards of front pay through retirement .... "); Neufeld v. Searle
Lab., 884 F.2d 335, 341 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The Court should presume that [the employee]
would have continued to work for [the employer] until retirement age, unless [the
employer] provides evidence to the contrary.").
168. See, e.g., Curtis v. Elec. & Space Corp., 113 F.3d 1498, 1504 (8th Cir. 1997)
("There may be a presumption that an employee will retire at a 'normal' retirement age,
but such a presumption does not control where there is evidence the employee would have
worked beyond that age." (citation omitted)).
169. SeeDonlin v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 88 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting
various decisions from "other courts of appeals [that have] affirmed front-pay awards of
10 years or more" and going on to similarly approve a front-pay award often years).
170. See Padilla v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 122 & nn.l-2, 126 (2d Cir.
1996) (approving twenty-four years of front pay); Luca, 344 Fed. App'x. at 641 (twenty-
three years); Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 511 (9th
Cir. 2000) (twenty-two years); Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, 978 F. Supp. 70, 81
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (twenty years).
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courts may give less if a plaintiff fails to mitigate his or her
damages.171 But that is unlikely to happen precisely because of the
uniqueness of religious employment; fired Methodist ministers do not
have to accept jobs in Lutheran churches.'72
Having to pay twenty years' worth of front pay-along with
other potential penalties like uncapped punitive damages in some
places' 73-is a serious burden on religious exercise. In effect, churches
have to pay for two ministers, one of whom is no longer working for
them. The essence of the Establishment Clause was that people
should not have to pay for a minister who is not their minister.'Y4 But
that is exactly what the front-pay remedy does: A church has to pay
for the state's minister and then find other money to pay for its own.
B. The Restructuring Problem
Our discussion of remedies has thus far focused on the
reinstatement problem, which arises when a court forcibly reinstates a
minister or alternatively awards him or her damages. But the
remedies issue also creates another threat to church autonomy from
171. Title VII does require mitigation. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006)
("Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or
persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.").
172. The duty to mitigate only requires that plaintiffs act reasonably. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (explaining that an "unemployed or
underemployed claimant need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take
a demeaning position"). Courts have consistently held that plaintiffs only have to take jobs
that " 'afford[] [them] virtually identical promotional opportunities, compensation, job
responsibilities, working conditions, and status.' " Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499
F.3d 474, 486 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 393
(5th Cir. 2003)); see also Caufield v. Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 133 Fed. App'x. 4, 11 (3d Cir.
2005) (same quoted language); Shore v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 42 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 1994)
(same quoted language); Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th
Cir. 1994) (same quoted language); Mitchell v. Humana Hosp.-Shoals, 942 F.2d 1581, 1583
n.2 (11 th Cir. 1991) (same quoted language).
173. By way of example, several state laws allow uncapped punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Dixon v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 83 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The Massachusetts
employment discrimination statute ... does not limit punitive damages."); Brady v.
Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 111 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (finding the same for
the Missouri Human Rights Act). There are no damage caps on employment
discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 either. See Goldsmith v. Bagby
Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2008) (" 'Congress has not seen fit to
impose any recovery caps in cases under § 1981 . (quoting Swinton v. Potomac
Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 820 (9th Cir. 2001))).
174. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947) (noting that "[tihe
imposition of taxes to pay ministers' salaries and to build and maintain churches and
church property aroused [the Framers'] indignation" and that it "was these feelings which
found expression in the First Amendment").
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another angle. Churches have more to fear than individual cases of
discrimination. We have not yet talked about the potential of class
actions. As we will see, without a sufficiently strong ministerial
exception, we can expect such suits. The restructuring problem
recognizes the distinct problems that would be created if the federal
courts began such an overhaul of American religion.
Most people think of employment discrimination laws strictly in
terms of individual cases of intentional discrimination. This view is
understandable-after all, most employment discrimination cases
involve single plaintiffs alleging instances of intentional
discrimination.'75 But employment discrimination laws go further than
that. All the major employment discrimination statutes allow
plaintiffs to bring class actions.176 Plaintiffs can bring class claims of
disparate treatment (claims that a group of people have all been
intentionally discriminated against because of their race, gender, age,
and so on) as well as class claims of disparate impact (claims that a
facially neutral employment practice has caused an unjustified impact
on a group of people because of their race, gender, age, and so on).'77
In both types of class actions, plaintiffs can seek damages and
reinstatement, along with injunctive relief-they can ask courts to
order structural changes to fix the discrimination and to prevent such
discrimination from arising in the future.'78
People have not talked much about the possibility of class action
suits brought against churches. Consider Justice Sotomayor's
comments in a ministerial exception case that she heard as a circuit
judge, Hankins v. Lyght 79 There she considered the Catholic Bishop
175. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 750-51 (2005) ("The great majority of employment discrimination suits
in federal courts ... are brought by individual plaintiffs asserting disparate treatment
claims.").
176. See Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2003)
("The last decade has seen an explosion of employment discrimination class action
lawsuits that have been resolved through record breaking settlements.").
177. See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 74-77 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining the difference
between disparate impact and disparate treatment theories).
178. Michael Selmi provides some excellent examples, including three case studies of
class actions brought against Texaco, Home Depot, and Denny's. See Selmi, supra note
176, at 1268-97. He concludes that money damages, rather than structural relief, is the
remedy increasingly sought by plaintiffs and awarded by courts. See id. at 1300 (arguing
that there has been "a shift in remedial focus from structural change to monetary relief").
179. 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006), ald sub nom. Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conference of
the United Methodist Church, 351 Fed. App'x. 489 (2d Cir. 2009).
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case, which exempted religious institutions from the National Labor
Relations Act.' 81 Justice Sotomayor suggested that the ministerial
exception should be interpreted narrowly, despite Catholic Bishop,
because employment laws simply did not threaten churches like labor
laws. While labor laws pervasively regulated religious institutions,
employment laws simply did not:
[T]he ADEA, unlike the NRLA, does not pose the risk of
extensive or continuous administrative or judicial intrusion into
the functions of religious institutions. Instead, the ADEA
involves routine regulatory interaction and requires no
inquiries into religious doctrine, no delegation of state power to
a religious body, and no detailed monitoring or close
administrative contact between secular and religious bodies. 8'
Other courts too have seen it this way. Eugene Volokh phrased things
like this: "Antidiscrimination law, the courts have reasoned, focuses
on discrete hiring decisions and thus involves not too much of an
entanglement, unlike labor law, which would inject the Board into
nearly everything."'82
There is much truth to this, but it perhaps does not consider
enough the possibility of class actions and the structural changes that
judges can order when granting relief in them. To understand the
issue fully, perhaps an example will work best. Consider one
relatively narrow issue-the issue of female clergy. Many Protestant
churches (and other groups, like Reform and Conservative Judaism)
ordain women and have generally sex-neutral policies. But despite
these official stances, women continue to be underrepresented within
the clerical ranks. In Protestant denominations, for example, female
clergy percentages range from one to about thirty percent-with a
general average of about ten to fifteen percent.'83 Women are thus
180. Id. at 116-17, 118 & n.13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For more on Catholic
Bishop, see supra Part I.B.4.
181. Hankins, 441 F.3d at 116 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
182. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1947 (2006).
183. See EDWARD C. LEHMAN, JR., PULPIT & PEW RESEARCH REPORTS, WOMEN'S
PATH INTO MINISTRY: SIX MAJOR STUDIES 4 (2002), available at
http://faithandleadership.com/programs/spe/resources/ppr/women.pdf ("Today the
proportion of female clergy in most mainline Protestant organizations averages about
fifteen percent."); BARBARA BROWN ZIKMUND ET AL., CLERGY WOMEN: AN UPHILL
CALLING 71 (1998) ("In our sample, which includes the largest Protestant denominations
that grant full-status ordination for women, the percentage of clergy women ranges from
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even more underrepresented in church ministry than they are in other
professions.'14
These imbalances create tremendous class action potential.
Without a ministerial exception (or with one reduced to claims of
conscience), plaintiffs' lawyers could bring large-scale, industrial-
strength class actions seeking structural reform of religious
denominations. In the attempt to reduce discrimination and
disparities, these suits would seek to change how churches operate.
They could attack seminaries and rabbinical schools, which
sometimes employ students, make decisions about ministry eligibility,
and act as employment agencies. They could attack a denomination's
ordination process. They could attack how the more hierarchical
churches employ and assign clergy among congregations.'85
Academics have spent a lot of time talking about how to restructure
the church to ensure gender equality.'86 Without a sufficiently strong
ministerial exception, that task will be turned over to Article III
judges.
C. The Control Problem
For centuries in this country, churches have generally functioned
independently of the state, receiving neither help nor hindrance from
the government in running their religious affairs. Leaving churches
alone to pursue their own religious goals in their own chosen ways is
as much the free exercise of religion as it is with individuals. Allowing
ministers to bring claims against their churches disrupts that religious
control over religious life. This section catalogues those disruptive
effects, collectively labeling them the control problem.
We start with a simple point. Even when churches agree with the
principles behind nondiscrimination laws, they still have
1% to 30%, averaging 10%."); see also Laura R. Olson et al., Changing Issue Agendas of
Women Clergy, 39 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 140, 141 (2000) ("It would be a mistake
to assume that women constitute anything but a small minority even within mainline
Protestantism ....").
184. See ZIKMUND ET AL., supra note 183, at 70 (stating that women make up, on
average, 10% ofclergy, but 21% of doctors and 25% of lawyers).
185. Though the class-action threat has not yet materialized, individual plaintiffs have
indeed demanded this sort of relief. In one recent case, a plaintiff was refused entry to a
seminary run by the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. She claimed she had been
discriminated against because of her age and sought an order forcing the seminary to take
her as a student in their Director of Christian Education program. See, e.g., Green v.
Concordia Univ., No. CV 09-1519-AC, 2010 WL 3522352, at *1 (D. Or. June 23, 2010).
186. Seesupra notes 183-84.
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understandable reasons to object to the government investigating,
adjudicating, and remedying what it decides are discriminatory acts.
There is all the difference in the world between a church pursuing its
own values and the state enforcing those values back on the church.
We recognize this all the time with individuals. Some people believe
that they should go to church every week. But almost none of them
would want the state to force them. And certainly no one thinks that
desiring to go somehow acts to waive the Establishment Clause. This
principle is just as true for churches as it is for individuals: There are
serious costs when the government coercively imposes its values on
people, even when the people happen to share the government's
values. Even when churches agree with the nondiscrimination norms
being applied to them, secular enforcement of those norms overrides
religious control of the institution.
Churches have their own procedures for handling disputes, and
these procedures go back centuries." 7 Sometimes these processes are
informal, consisting mostly of mediation. Sometimes they are highly
formal, involving ecclesiastical courts. Consider Hosanna-Tabor v.
EEOC.'88 There the teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a commissioned
minister in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod who taught fourth
grade at a parochial school affiliated with a congregation belonging to
the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. The Missouri Synod has long
required that ministers bring disputes with their churches through the
Synod's dispute-resolution process.189 This is both longstanding
church tradition and deep theological belief.9' And in the Synod's
187. For an explanation of how church courts work in a wide variety of denominations,
see generally Steven R. Hadley, Handbook ofAmerican Church Courts, 22 WHITTIER L.
REV. 251 (2000).
188. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769
(6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. Mar. 29, 2011) (No. 10-553).
Hosanna-Tabor is discussed in more detail later. See infra Part VII.
189. The Synod's rules say that its internal process "shall be the exclusive remedy to
resolve such disputes." HANDBOOK OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD
§ 1.10.2, at 37 (2004), available atwww.lcms.org/Document.fdocsrc=lcm&id=926; see also
id. § 1.10.1.1, at 36 ("The use of the Synod's conflict resolution procedures shall be the
exclusive and final remedy for those who are in dispute. Fitness for ministry and other
theological matters must be determined within the church.").
190. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:1 (New English) ("When one of you has a grievance
against another, does he dare go to law before the unrighteous instead of the saints?").
This biblical text led to the development of church courts more than a millennium ago.
See, e.g., THE COUNCIL OF CHALCEDON, CANON IX, at 97 (Richard Price & Michael
Gaddis trans., 2005) (451) ("If any cleric has a suit to bring against a cleric, he is not to
leave his own bishop and have recourse to civil courts, but is first to argue the case before
his own bishop .... If anyone infringes this, he is subject to the canonical penalties. If a
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system, ministers like Perich have significant protections, both
procedural and substantive. On the procedural side, Synod rules
provide for limited discovery and compulsory process of witnesses,
forbid ex parte contacts, protect the right to counsel, establish the
right to present evidence, and create an appeal process.19" ' Disputes
are handled by neutrally selected reconcilers, people randomly
chosen from a long, nationwide list of trained personnel maintained
by the Synod (not the congregation).' Both sides can challenge
reconcilers for cause,'193 and both sides have peremptory strikes.' 94 On
the substantive side, the Synod's courts would only approve of
Perich's call being terminated in rare and specifically delineated
circumstances, like if she were teaching false doctrine, disobeying
church teaching, or living a highly immoral life.' 95 Thus, to the extent
the church found Perich's disability claim factually supported, she
would win her case.
Without a ministerial exception, these well-established systems
of church governance become irrelevant. In another illustrative case,
an ordained Presbyterian minister sued her church, claiming that its
senior pastor had sexually harassed her.'96 She had previously brought
the dispute before the internal courts of the Presbyterian Church,
where an investigating committee made up of three women and two
men unanimously rejected her claims.'97 The Ninth Circuit let her
claim go forward, viewing the church's earlier resolution of her claims
as immaterial. 9 ' The court stuck by this conclusion even though the
minister had sworn "to be governed by [the] Church's polity, and to
bide by its discipline."'9 9 The Ninth Circuit suggested that such a
cleric has a suit against his own or another bishop, he is to plead his case to the synod of
the province.").
191. SeeHANDBOOK OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, supra note 189,
§ 1.10.7.4(a)-(d), at 42, § 1.10.18.1(a)-(i), at 47-49.
192. Id. § 1.10.13.1(a), at 45 (requiring nine names to be randomly chosen from the list
of reconcilers nationwide).
193. Id. § 1.10.16, at 47.
194. Id. § 1.10.13.1(c), at 45 (allowing each side three peremptory strikes).
195. See COMMISSION ON THEOLOGY & CHURCH RELATIONS OF THE LUTHERAN
CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD, THEOLOGY AND PRACTICE OF "THE DIVINE CALL" 25
(2003), available at http://www.lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=410 (explaining the
rare instances where called workers can be removed from office).
196. SeeElvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2004).
197. See id. at 971 (Trott, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 965 & n.9 (majority opinion).
199. Id. at 974 (Trott, J., dissenting) (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, W.S.A., BOOK OF ORDER § G-14.0405e (1986)). The dissent
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promise might well be unconscionable and therefore unenforceable
anyway.
200
Part of the control problem is that the prospect of secular
enforcement threatens church autonomy, even when churches agree
with the discrimination laws in question. Another part of the problem
lies in the fact that churches might agree with the broad abstract ideal
of nondiscrimination, but not with the precise details of anti-
discrimination laws. One church might interpret God's will as
requiring uncompromising colorblindness. Another might see God as
demanding an integrated church, which might require intentional
racial balancing or affirmative action. The Supreme Court has been
deeply split over whether to adopt the former view
(nondiscrimination as colorblindness) or the latter view
(nondiscrimination as an integrative ideal).2"1 Churches will be split as
well. Courts should not impose a legal requirement of colorblindness
on churches that believe in affirmative action, just as courts should
not impose racial balancing on churches that believe in
colorblindness.
Frankly, it would be quite surprising if churches happened to
agree with all the specifics of nondiscrimination laws. Discrimination
means different things to different people."' While anti-
discrimination laws all try to promote equality, their specific
conceptions of equality and the specific ways they try to promote it
are highly contingent and sometimes even downright strange.
Consider the law regarding disparate impacts. Employers cannot have
facially neutral practices that have unjustified disparate impacts on
quotes the oath, but the majority also accepts these as the relevant facts. Id. at 965 n.9
(majority opinion).
200. See id. at 965 n.9 (majority opinion).
201. This point was made vividly in Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), where the Court deeply fractured on the validity of the
colorblindness theory. Compare id. at 748 (plurality opinion) ("The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race."), and id.
at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The plurality's
postulate that '[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race' is not sufficient to decide these cases." (citation
omitted)), with id. at 862 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[lit is for [the people] to decide, to
quote the plurality's slogan, whether the best 'way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.'" (citation omitted)).
202. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592 (1983) ("The
language of Title VI on its face is ambiguous; the word 'discrimination' is inherently so.");
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) ("The concept of
'discrimination' . . . is susceptible of varying interpretations ... ").
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the basis of things like race or sex.203 A test that weeds out female
applicants at a substantially higher rate than male ones, for example,
is illegal unless it is "job related" and "consistent with business
necessity. ' '2°4 But employers also are prohibited from fixing disparate
impacts unnecessarily-throwing out that test because it weeds out
female applicants at a substantially higher rate than male ones is itself
illegal, unless there is a "strong basis in evidence" to believe the test
was illegal in the first place. 2 5 No church shares this precise
conception of gender equality. In this day and age, most churches see
themselves as fully committed to racial justice, to gender equality, to
treating the disabled with dignity, and to protecting the elderly. But
there is no reason to think that the church's conception of any of
these things will match the state's conception.2 6 And requiring the
two to match denies the church any independent right of conscience.
And if autonomy includes a right to decide on the meaning of
one's values, it also includes a right to decide on the priority of one's
values. Earlier we discussed the ordination of women and how
various Protestant churches and Jewish synagogues ordain women
but continue to have few female clergy.27 At least part of the reason
for these imbalances is theological in nature. Many Protestant
churches are committed to allowing local congregations freedom to
choose their own clergy.20 8 But this theological commitment comes
203. This prohibition on facially neutral actions that have unjustified disparate impacts
goes all the way back to the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2006). This is the requirement in Title VII,
which applies to considerations of race, national origin, sex, and religion. See id. The
prohibition on disparate impacts in the context of age is a bit different. See Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (explaining why "the scope of disparate-impact liability
under ADEA is narrower than under Title VII").
205. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) ("We conclude that race-
based action like the City's in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the
employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it
would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute."). For more on the Riccicase,
see generally Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010).
206. For an excellent article making this same point in regard to the Catholic Bishop
case, see generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Mandatory Collective
Bargaining Under Federal and State Labor Laws: Freedom From and Freedom For, 49
VILL. L. REV. 77 (2004) (pointing out how both the Catholic Church and the National
Labor Relations Act are concerned with the rights of workers, but how they disagree
deeply on the proper ways of doing so).
207. See supra Part V.B (discussing the restructuring problem).
208. This issue was of utmost importance in both the German and English
Reformations; people hated that the Catholic Church appointed bishops and priests
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with costs-local congregations are often the ones most reluctant
about female ministers. °9 These denominations have made a choice.
They believe in the principle of gender equality, but they will not
force female clergy on unwilling congregations. They value gender
equality, but they have other religious commitments too. On July 2,
1965-the day Title VII went into effect-nonreligious organizations
had to change their ways overnight.21° But that should not be forced
on Protestant churches who are trying to ordain women without
compromising their other religious concerns. If the Catholic Church
can refuse to ordain women altogether, Protestant churches should be
allowed to ordain women at their own pace. There is also, of course,
the flip side. Some Protestant churches engage in affirmative action
for women. There are anecdotal accounts of bishops stacking the
deck in favor of female applicants for clergy positions (such as by
giving a local congregation three choices for its minister, all of which
just happen to be female).' There is no guarantee that such
programs comply with the requirements the Supreme Court has laid
out for affirmative action programs.212 Just as churches should not be
sued for integrating women too slowly into the priesthood, they
should not be sued for integrating them too quickly either.
without caring about what their congregations wanted. See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A.
NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 9 (3d ed. 2011).("Martin Luther (1483-1546), John Calvin (1509-
1564), Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), Menno Simons (1496-1561), and other sixteenth-
century reformers all began their movements with a call for freedom: freedom of the
individual conscience from intrusive canon laws and clerical controls, freedom of political
officials from ecclesiastical power and privileges, and freedom of the local clergy from
both central papal rule and oppressive princely controls.").
209. See Patricia M. Y. Chang, Female Clergy in the Contemporary Protestant Church:
A Current Assessmen4 36 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 565, 567 (1997) (explaining the
"resistance to hiring a female pastor at the local church level" in many Protestant
denominations that officially ordain women); see also Edward C. Lehman, Jr., Clergy
Women's World.- Musings ofa Fox, 43 REV. OF RELIGIouS RES. 5, 11(2001) ("On the one
hand, most research indicates that a majority of lay church members are open to the idea
of having a woman as their pastor. Typically between two-thirds and three-fourths of the
members relate to the idea positively .... Yet a woman's candidacy becomes a 'problem'
even to them. They typically feel intimidated as the very vocal minority who oppose
women in ministry make threats about what they will do if the church installs a woman
[like] ... withhold their financial contributions [or] leave the parish." (emphasis omitted)).
210. SeeGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971) (discussing the validity of
several tests that the Company added "on July 2, 1965, the date on which Title VII became
effective").
211. Affirmative action programs for women are discussed in ZIKMUND ET AL., supra
note 183, at 76-80.
212. Affirmative action programs are regulated under the legal framework arising from
the Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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D. The Inquiry Problem
We now turn to our final justification for the autonomy
component. At bottom, the inquiry problem is a concern about
inaccurate fact finding-the risk that the jury will perceive
discrimination erroneously. Such a risk is present in every
employment discrimination case, of course. But such risks are
heightened in ministerial exception cases because they require juries
to resolve thorny questions about religious doctrine and religious
motivation. Explaining those risks is the focus of this final section.
Juries and other fact finders make mistakes. Sometimes these
mistakes are minor. But sometimes they are severe. An innocent
criminal defendant is incarcerated; a corporation that ought to pay a
multi-million dollar tort judgment gets off scot-free, Employment
discrimination cases are notoriously challenging in this respect. In
deciding the issue of discriminatory intent, the jury must draw
inferences about what happened in the mind of the person who made
the employment decision in question."3 This is very uncertain terrain.
Some argue that juries frequently fail to detect discrimination that
exists; others think that juries frequently find discrimination
incorrectly. 14 Both sides face the same problem-the truth of what
really happened is very hard to discern, even in hindsight.
Any attempt to weigh the costs of applying the employment
discrimination laws to religious institutions must consider the risk of
error. Employment discrimination cases, like other types of cases, use
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard,215  which aims at
reducing the overall number of errors. 216 A jury that is fifty-one
213. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(noting that "[a]ll courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in
discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult" as "[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes").
214. Compare Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (arguing, in part, that fact finders fail to detect
discrimination when it really exists), with WALTER K. OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY:
How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 63 (1997)
(arguing, in part, that fact finders detect discrimination when it really does not exist).
215. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) ("Conventional
rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases, and one of these rules is that
parties to civil litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence."
(citations and quotation marks omitted)).
216. See Neil Orloff& Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (1983) ("If the goal is to minimize
the number of erroneously decided cases or the sum of the wrongful payments that are
made, the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule emerges as the superior choice."). In this
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percent sure that an employer has committed intentional
discrimination will find against him. 17 In the ordinary run of
employment discrimination cases, we accept this forty-nine percent
risk of error as a necessary cost of our society's commitment to basic
equality principles. 218 But religious employment changes the balance
in two different ways.
First, mistaken findings of discrimination are more harmful. We
explored this in earlier sections. The reinstatement problem dealt
with the harm of court-ordered reinstatement of ministers;2 9 the
restructuring problem addressed the prospect of forced institutional
reform;220 the control problem documented the disruption of church
authority.22' All of these harms are present when a jury accurately
finds discrimination. They are just as much of a concern when a jury
does so inaccurately.
Second, mistaken findings of discrimination are more likely in
the context of religious employment. This brings us to the inquiry
problem itself, which can be seen with a simple example. Say a
minister is fired. In response, he brings an age-discrimination claim
against the church contesting his dismissal. In most cases, the church
will contend what defendants usually contend-that there was
something wrong with the plaintiff's job performance. Maybe he was
bad in the pulpit; maybe people did not like his Bible studies; maybe
he was not good at counseling parishioners. The way our employment
discrimination laws work, the jury focuses on the church's reasons
and decides whether they are pretext for age discrimination.222 This
way the preponderance standard treats every error as equally harmful. See, e.g., Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) ("A preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard allows both parties to 'share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion .......
(quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979))).
217. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) ("The burden of showing something by a 'preponderance of
the evidence' . . . 'simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is
more probable than its nonexistence ......."(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
218. SeeLaycock, supra note 154, at 261.
219. See supra Part V.A.
220. See supra Part V.B.
221. See supra Part V.C.
222. This is the famous burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also George Rutherglen, Abolition in a Different Voice, 78
VA. L. REV. 1463, 1474 (1992) (book review) ("Almost all individual cases under
McDonnell Douglas come down to a determination whether the plaintiff has proved that
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the defendant is really a pretext for
discrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a more recent look on the
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requires a jury to decide thoroughly religious questions. How good
were his sermons, Bible studies, and religious counseling?
Some courts have noticed this problem. The Seventh Circuit
phrased these concerns well in a case where a music director of a
Catholic diocese brought an age-discrimination lawsuit.223 Judge
Posner dismissed the case because of the inquiry problem that it
potentially raised:
[I]f the suit were permitted to go forward, the diocese would
argue that he was dismissed for a religious reason-his opinion
concerning the suitability of particular music for Easter
services-and the argument could propel the court into a
controversy, quintessentially religious, over what is suitable
music for Easter services. Tomic would argue that the church's
criticism of his musical choices was a pretext for firing him, that
the real reason was his age. The church would rebut with
evidence of what the liturgically proper music is for an Easter
Mass and Tomic might in turn dispute the church's claim. The
court would be asked to resolve a theological dispute." 4
There are cases like Tomic which recognize this inquiry problem
(though the courts, of course, do not use that phrase). But they have
been fiercely criticized and sometimes rejected outright.
Commentators have pointed out that this difficulty will not present
itself in every case. Say a minister is fired and claims age
discrimination. There will be little inquiry problem if the church
claims it fired the minister for being an alcoholic, or for being
chronically late, or for having been convicted of a felony.2 5 Instead of
a ministerial exception barring all antidiscrimination claims by
ministers, courts should look at the actual facts of the case, decide
whether there is an inquiry problem under those particular facts, and
only dismiss the case if there is such a problem. Most courts have
framework, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,
745-47 (2011).
223. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006).
224. Id. at 1040 (citation omitted).
225. One commentator points out that there may not have been an inquiry problem in
Tomic itself. After all, the Seventh Circuit here seems to assume that the church will claim
to have fired Tomic for something related to his religious duties. This might not have been
the case. See Vartanian, supra note 6, at 1062 ("Tomic ... exemplifies the excessive
speculation that courts often employ to justify dismissal under the doctrine." (citation
omitted)).
NORTH CAROLINA LA WRE VIEW
handled it this way,226 on a case-by-case basis. 227 Commentators also
seem to recommend this way of doing things.28 But there are several
problems with this approach.
First, it gets the proportions of these cases incorrectly. Few of
these cases involve churches firing ministers for being alcoholics or
felons; none of the decided cases, to my knowledge, look at all like
that. Ministers are hired to do religious duties. So when they are fired,
it is usually because of a perceived failure to do those religious duties.
Cases therefore inevitably involve the jury judging the plaintiffs
religious fitness for ministry. Juries have to decide what the plaintiff's
religious duties really were, whether the plaintiff did them well, what
it means for them to be done well or poorly, and whether they were
really so important than the church could not stand getting them done
right. And this is true even though the church's stated rationale might
not relate on its face to ministry. "Even reasons that sound
superficially secular are often religious at their core. For example,
decisions about budget are decisions about religious priorities.
229
Indeed, even if we were to imagine cases where the church's
reason was entirely secular, religious considerations would still enter
in through the back door. The simple fact is that every employment
discrimination case involves the issue of how well the plaintiff was
doing her job. Job performance affects everything. When an
employee's job performance is good, juries will rightly suspect even
226. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993) ("There
may be cases involving lay employees in which the relationship between employee and
employer is so pervasively religious that it is impossible to engage in an age-discrimination
inquiry without serious risk of offending the Establishment Clause. This is not such a
case."). For other cases adopting this sort of reasoning, see Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d
198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008); Hankins v. Lygbt, 441 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2006); Gargano v.
Diocese ofRockville Ctr., 80 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1996).
227. See, e.g., Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.
1994) ("The case-by-case approach ... is the appropriate method for determining those
matters which threaten constitutional infringement."); Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference
of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("It could turn out that
in attempting to prove his case, appellant will be forced to inquire into matters of
ecclesiastical policy .... On the other hand, it may turn out that the potentially
mischievous aspects of Minker's claim are not contested by the Church or are subject to
entirely neutral methods of proof. The speculative nature of our discussion here
demonstrates why it is premature to foreclose appellant's ... claim. Once evidence is
offered, the district court will be in a position to control the case so as to protect against
any impermissible entanglements.").
228. See Corbin, supra note 6, at 2013-22; Vartanian, supra note 6, at 1062.
229. See Brief for the Petitioner at 29, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, No. 10-553 (U.S. June
20, 2011), 2011 WL 2414707, at *29.
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legitimate-sounding reasons as possibly pretextual. And if they find
pretext, they will be quick to conclude that discrimination was the
real reason. When an employee's job performance is bad, juries will
be hesitant to doubt an employer's legitimate-sounding reasons. And
if the juries find pretext, they will be quick to come up with some
other nondiscriminatory explanation.230 Thus, when the job involves
highly religious duties, juries will inevitably be drawn in every case to
the issue of whether the plaintiff did those religious job duties well.
And in doing so, juries will rely on their own preconceptions
about religion in passing judgment on religious groups that might
think quite differently. A great example of how things might go
wrong lies in an older Third Circuit case, Geary v. Visitation of the
Blessed Virgin Mary Parish School.2 ' Geary was a parochial school
teacher who was fired by the Catholic Church. She claimed she was
fired because of her age.232 The Church said she was fired for
marrying a divorced man, a violation of Catholic doctrine. 3 The
Third Circuit rejected the idea that there was any inquiry problem.234
On one level, this makes sense. After all, a jury can indeed figure out
whether Geary married a divorced man and whether that violated
Catholic doctrine. But remember that, at trial, Geary could admit that
she married a divorced man in violation of Catholic doctrine, but then
just argue that the violation of church doctrine was not the real
reason she was fired.235 As part of that, Geary's lawyer would try to
subtly persuade the jury that the Church does not really believe its
230. This is what juries are supposed to do. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
a plaintiff must not only prove pretext, he or she must show that the pretext was a mask
for intentional discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993)
("That the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does
not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason ... is correct.").
231. 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993).
232. Id. at 326.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 329-30. The Third Circuit ultimately dismissed Geary's ADEA claim on the
merits, claiming that Geary had not put forward any evidence that would create a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. at 332.
235. Pretext exists, even when the asserted nondiscriminatory reason is literally true, if
it did not subjectively motivate the employment decision in question. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) ("An employer may not, in other words,
prevail ... by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did
not motivate it at the time of the decision."). Many lower court cases make this same
point. See, e.g., White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting
that a plaintiff can "demonstrate pretext by showing that the employer's stated reason for
the adverse employment action either (1) has no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual
reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the employer's action").
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stated doctrine-at least not to the point of firing long-standing
teachers for trivial violations of it. Geary's lawyer would point out
that remarriage is common in our society, that even many American
Catholics remarry, and that the Catholic Church hardly deters divorce
by firing people who remarry. Any good plaintiffs lawyer would
make that argument; he or she would suggest that the Catholic
Church's position is so fundamentally unbelievable that it could not
really have motivated the defendant's action and therefore must be
pretext.236 Juries who know little about Catholicism might end up
agreeing with that. Juries hostile to Catholicism (or this particular
tenet of Catholicism) might know better but impose liability anyway.
And Catholicism is a well-known religion in this country. Imagine the
problems that less mainstream religions will face. Courts in regular
employment cases often say that "[t]he more idiosyncratic or
questionable the employer's reason, the easier it will be to expose it
as a pretext. 237 That statement makes sense in the ordinary run of
employment discrimination cases, but there are many religions in this
country that juries might find idiosyncratic or questionable.
There is a final problem with the case-by-case approach-a
problem that becomes obvious if we step back and look at the forest
rather than the trees. The case-by-case approach is unworkable.
Under it, courts are supposed to dismiss ministerial claims without
any inquiry into the facts once the church offers a religious reason for
firing the minister. In that rare case when a church offers a
nonreligious reason for the firing, the claims can proceed. 238 But think
about what will happen. Churches have a lot of control over the
nondiscriminatory reasons that they choose to offer. They will often
phrase their decisions in religious terms, usually authentically. But
plaintiffs will rightly point out the incentive problem here-churches
236. Justice Jackson once feared this very thing-he believed that juries would
inevitably be unable to figure out what a defendant honestly believed without relying on
their own preconceptions about religion. Unable to see how a defendant could believe
something so strange, they would conclude that he must not really believe it. See United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("I do not see how we can
separate an issue as to what is believed from considerations as to what is believable.").
237. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Velizquez-
Fernandez v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (same language); Kautz v.
Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2005) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (same language).
238. See Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that courts
"may pretermit any 'plausibility inquiry [because such an inquiry] could give rise to
constitutional problems where, as in the case at bar, a defendant proffers a religious
purpose for a challenged employment action'" (quoting DeMarco v. Holy Cross High
Sch., 4 F.3d 463,476 (1st Cir. 2007))).
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have crass incentives to falsely portray their decisions in religious
terms because they get a free pass by doing so. Courts deciding these
cases will therefore find themselves at an impasse. If they simply
accept the church's reasons at face value, the case-by-case approach
will have become a categorical rule in favor of the ministerial
exception. But if they submit the factual issue to the jury to decide
whose facts are right, then the inquiry problem comes back, and the
case-by-case approach will have become a categorical rule against the
ministerial exception. All this is to say that a case-by-case approach
simply will not work.
VI. THE DOCTRINAL OBJECTION
Throughout earlier sections, this Article has tried to respond to
possible objections in the places where such responses made the most
sense. It preemptively addressed, for example, claims that church
autonomy precedents do not require a ministerial exception,239 claims
that monetary relief is an acceptable alternative to reinstatement,240
claims that religious exercise is not burdened when a church has no
theological objection to the anti-discrimination law in question, 24' and
claims that the inquiry problem should be handled case by case.242 But
one objection has been set aside until now that must be addressed
head-on. Many have claimed that the Supreme Court's 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith, 24 3 which radically changed the
nature of the Free Exercise Clause, destroys the ministerial
exception.244 Examining this claim is the task of this section.
239. See supra Parts I.B.2-4.
240. See supra notes 159-74 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
243. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
244. See Corbin, supra note 6, at 1983 ("Under Smith, then, the free exercise clause
should not shield religious practices from Title VII."); Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Thou
Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Access to Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. L.J. 269, 278
(1998) ("Smith, therefore, did away with the previous balancing test [which seems to
make] any neutral law valid [like Title VII], no matter what the effect on religion.");
Hamilton, supra note 6, at 1195 ("Strictly speaking, the judicially crafted ministerial
exception is inconsistent with ... Smith."); McPhail, supra note 6, at 232 ("However
reluctant courts have been to apply Smith's holding to religious organizations, it is clear
that there is little reason for refusing to do so."); Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the
Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 734 (2005) ("Ministerial exemptions ...
inexplicably persist after Smith even though the civil rights statutes are not aimed at
religion."); Fulton, supra note 6, at 209 ("Circuit courts continue to apply the ministerial
exception to religion-neutral laws, and Smith has effectively been disregarded."); Martin,
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Smith is one of the most well-known American church and state
cases. At stake in Smith was whether members of the Native
American Church had the right to use peyote despite an Oregon law
generally forbidding its use.245 The Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs' particular claim in Smith. But even more importantly, the
Court changed the test. Before the Court's decision in Smith, free
exercise cases had been handled under a strict scrutiny framework
associated with two cases, Sherbert v. VerneI46 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder.247 Any burden on religious exercise had to be justified by the
government demonstrating a compelling interest pursued by the least
restrictive means. Smith changed that, saying that burdens on
religious exercise required no justification as long as they were
neutral and generally applicable. 4 This is where the ministerial
exception applies. Given that the employment discrimination laws are
surely both neutral and generally applicable, Smith seems to overrule
the ministerial exception or, at least, be deeply inconsistent with it.249
This argument has some force, but there are numerous possible
responses. First, Smith is a free exercise case. But the ministerial
exception is grounded just as much in disestablishment concerns as in
free exercise. Watson v. Jones directly linked church autonomy with
disestablishment.25 ° Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral said its result
was required by the "separation of church and state,"2 '' a doctrine
associated then and now with the Establishment Clause. 2 And
supra note 6, at 1302 ("[T]he clear language of Smith suggests it may override the
ministerial exception.").
245. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-85. For a detailed examination of the Smith case, see
generally Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953 (1998).
246. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
247. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
248. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
249. The concepts of both neutrality and general applicability were fleshed out more in
a later case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City ofHialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-40,
542-46 (1993). But much is still unresolved. See Lund, supra note 143, at 633-44
(discussing the areas of uncertainty).
250. SeeWatson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727-29 (1871) (explaining that courts
in the United States were ill-equipped to handle ecclesiastical disputes compared to courts
in the United Kingdom because courts in the United Kingdom regularly dealt with
internal church disputes occurring within the Anglican church).
251. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952) ("Here there is a transfer by statute of control over churches. This
violates our rule of separation between church and state.").
252. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) ("The first of the two
Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause, commands a separation of church
and state."); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) ("[T]he clause against
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throughout this Article, we have talked about the Establishment
Clause rationales for the ministerial exception. The Establishment
Clause bars the state from appointing clergy; it makes sense that it
would bar the state from reappointing them as well." 3 And the
Establishment Clause's ban on government deciding religious
questions should prevent juries from passing, as they inevitably will in
these cases, on what it means to be a good minister."4 Should the
Court in Hosanna-Tabor therefore wish to preserve the ministerial
exception, it could speak amorphously about the First Amendment or
ground the ministerial exception in the Establishment Clause. It need
not address Smith at all.
255
But there is a second and perhaps more obvious way to reconcile
Smith with the ministerial exception. Near the beginning of the Smith
opinion, the Court explicitly preserved the church autonomy cases
that gave rise to the ministerial exception. Citing those cases
approvingly, the Court reaffirmed how, even after Smith, government
would not be able to "lend its power to one or the other side in
controversies over religious authority or dogma. 256 Controversies
between a minister and a congregation over who gets to run the
church are surely controversies over religious authority.2 7 Even by its
own terms, then, Smith could be read to preserve the ministerial
exception .258
Third and finally, even if this passage in Smith did not exist,
Smith's natural scope might not include ministerial exception claims.
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
Church and State.'" (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947))).
253. The point was put perfectly in Hosanna-Tabor's opening brief. See Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 229, at *14. ("The Establishment Clause prevents government from
appointing ministers. And it therefore prevents courts from reinstating ministers.").
254. See supra Part V.D.
255. There is also the right of expressive association, most often associated with the
Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Usually Dale
is raised by those who would want to narrow the ministerial exception. Dale is a
conscience-based right-at best, Dale would only give churches the right to avoid anti-
discrimination laws to which they religiously object. Relying on the right of expressive
association but going beyond Dale, Douglas Laycock has very recently argued to the
Court that the better analogy is to the Court's political-association cases. See Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 229, at *33-36.
256. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969)); see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-25 (1976); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95-119.
257. See supra Part I.B.1.
258. See Brady, supra note 87, at 1676-79 (making the same sort of claim as in Smith).
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The church autonomy cases have always represented a distinct line of
precedent separate and aside from the conscientious objection cases
like Sherbert and Yoder. Smith overruled Sherbert and Yoder.259 And
Smith overruled the compelling interest test that Sherbert and Yoder
had established. But none of the church autonomy cases from this
period-not Jones v. Wolf, not Catholic Bishop, not Milivojevich, not
Maryland and Virginia Eldership, not Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull-
none of them refer at all to the compelling interest test.26° None of
them quote or even cite Sherbert or Yoder. Think also about the
concerns of the Smith court. Justice Scalia talked at length about the
uncertainties of what would constitute a compelling governmental
interest, the dangers of balancing, and the functional impossibility of
a regime where religious objectors could seek exemption from every
kind of governmental action.26" ' Those concerns do not apply in the
context of ministerial exception claims. There is no compelling
interest test. There is no balancing. And because the claims here all
relate to matters of internal church autonomy, claims of exemption
will be limited to those few laws that burden the church's right to self-
governance. Simply put, neither the words nor the logic of Smith
require the destruction of the ministerial exception.
This is not to say that the proponents of the ministerial exception
clearly win the battle over Smith. Smith is flexible. The Supreme
Court could interpret Smith to preserve the ministerial exception; it
could interpret Smith to eliminate it. The Supreme Court's hands are
simply not tied either way. As a result, whatever direction the Court
chooses to go will be determined by the Court's view of the merits of
the ministerial exception. It will not be because the Court feels bound
by Smith.
262
259. The Court purported to distinguish both cases, but most commentators see Smith
as simply overruling them. See Lund, supra note 143, at 631 & n.19 (2003) (explaining the
point and providing citations).
260. See generally Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (providing no references to the
compelling state interest); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (same);
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (same); Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam) (same); MaryElizabeth Blue Hull, 393
U.S. 440 (1969) (same). There is only one exception, which really proves the rule. Catholic
Bishop at one point cites Yoder on a side point about the difficulty of drawing a line
between things that are "completely religious" and "merely religiously associated."
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 495.
261. SeeSmith, 494 U.S. at 885-89.
262. The Supreme Court, of course, is not really bound to its earlier precedents
anyway. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (explaining how "[t]he
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VII. THE SCOPE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND A CLOSER
LOOK AT HOSANNA-TABOR v. EEOC
Once the existence of the ministerial exception is firmly
established, the question becomes its scope: If "ministers" are
categorically barred from bringing employment discrimination claims
against the churches that employ them, then who exactly is a
''minister"?
The last part of the Article addresses that question, focusing on
the case before the Supreme Court in the fall of 2011, Hosanna-Tabor
v. EEOC.263 Resolving the controversy in Hosanna-Tabor will
probably require the Court to draw some line distinguishing ministers
from non-ministers, and this final part offers some suggestions on
how to do it.
A. The Facts ofHosanna-Tabor
Given the fact-intensive nature of any minister/non-minister
distinction, it is worth spending some time going over the particular
details of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran
Church is a congregation in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
("LCMS"), a conservative Lutheran denomination. As part of its
ministry, Hosanna-Tabor ran a small school with around eighty-five
students. Cheryl Perich, who taught fourth grade, was one of the
seven teachers who taught at the school.
264
Like other fourth-grade teachers, Perich taught the full range of
secular subjects-things like reading, writing, and arithmetic. But, as
a teacher at a religious school, she was expected to integrate religion
into these generally secular topics. And Perich also provided religious
instruction more directly. She taught a thirty-minute religion class
four times a week. She prayed with her students three times a day.
She led devotions for about five or ten minutes each morning. Each
week, she took her students to a thirty-minute chapel service. And
doctrine of stare decisis has only a limited application in the field of constitutional law"
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).
263. 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3552 (U.S. March 29, 2011)
(No. 10-553).
264. See Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772; Joint Appendix at 121, Hosanna-Tabor v.
EEOC, No. 10-553 (U.S. June 13, 2011), 2011 WL 2940670, at *121 [hereinafter Joint
Appendix].
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she led that service twice a year, arranging the service, deciding on
Bible readings, and crafting a homily.265
Perich also was a commissioned minister in the LCMS. LCMS
schools distinguish between two kinds of teachers-called teachers
(i.e., commissioned ministers) and lay teachers. Called teachers are
special. The congregation itself chooses them based on the
congregation's belief that the teacher has been "called" by God into
the position. Such jobs (referred to as "calls") are open-ended in
terms of time and can only be rescinded by the congregation for cause
and by supermajority vote. Lay teachers, on the other hand, are hired
rather than called. And they are hired by the school board rather than
the congregation. Employed exclusively on one-year contracts, lay
teachers are not to be used at all unless there is a shortage of called
teachers. Lay teachers need not be Lutheran, though they must be
Christian and willing to teach Lutheranism.266
Becoming a called teacher is a difficult and time-intensive
process. One must be an LCMS member who satisfies various
educational, moral, and religious standards. One must then get
accepted into a Colloquy program at a LCMS seminary, take
theology classes, complete an internship, and pass an oral
examination. Candidates then become eligible for a call from a
congregation. Commissioned ministers are employed in a number of
functions within LCMS churches, but most frequently they serve as
called teachers.267
Turning back to the facts of this case, Perich started as a lay
teacher for Hosanna-Tabor in 1999 on a one-year contract, although
she was in the process of becoming a commissioned minister and
called teacher. She became a commissioned minister in 2002 and
received a call from the congregation that same year. In June 2004,
before the school year began, Perich developed an illness, later
diagnosed as narcolepsy, where she passed out without warning and
could not be easily woken up. With no firm diagnosis, Perich agreed
to go on disability leave for the coming school year, and it was unclear
when (or if) she would be able to return.
268
265. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772-73 (describing these tasks as part of Perich's job
duties).
266. Id. at 772-73 (describing the teacher selection process).
267. Id. at 772; see also Brief of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 150, at *2-16 (explaining the process to
become a called teacher in more detail).
268. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 773-74.
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Hosanna-Tabor dealt with the situation initially by combining
three grades under one teacher. When this did not work out well, it
hired a replacement teacher for Perich's class for the rest of the year.
In December 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy, started
receiving treatment for it, and informed the school that she would
return in February or March. The school, however, hesitated. It
expressed concerns about Perich's health, her ability to care for
students, what to do with the replacement teacher it just hired, and
the fact that Perich would have been the third teacher some students
had that academic year. The school eventually asked Perich to resign
her call with the understanding that it could be renewed the following
year. But Perich said that she has gotten a medical release from her
doctor and that she wanted to come back right away.269
Things came to a head in February 2005 when Perich showed up
at the school with little notice, insisting on coming to work and
refusing to leave until she got a letter acknowledging that she had
reported to work. The school gave her the letter but clearly saw her as
somewhat insubordinate and self-centered, more concerned with her
own welfare than with the ministry of the school. Everything finally
collapsed when Perich threatened to bring suit, which the school saw
as a violation of the congregation-clergy relationship and of Lutheran
doctrine requiring internal church resolution of internal church
disputes. The congregation voted 40 to 11 to rescind Perich's call, and
in turn Perich filed suit.27 Perich ultimately brought two retaliation
claims against the church-one based on the ADA and one based on
Michigan state law. The district court dismissed Perich's case, finding
that Perich was a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial
exception.27' But the Sixth Circuit disagreed and reinstated her case.272
As the next section will explore, the Supreme Court in Hosanna-
Tabor will have to decide on the scope of the ministerial exception.
But it is worth a preliminary note to see how Hosanna-Tabor
illustrates many of the concerns discussed in earlier sections of this
Article. There is a concern about conscience. Perich violated the
church's long-standing policy that religious disputes be resolved
within the church and not by the courts. This dovetails with the
control concern. For centuries, these sorts of disputes have been
269. Id. at 774.
270. Id. at 774-75.
271. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d
881, 892 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
272. Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 772-73.
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resolved internally by the Synod, in accordance with the religious
beliefs shared by both sides. The case also presents a problem about
reinstatement-both Perich's and the EEOC's complaint demand
that Perich be reinstated to her old position.273 There are also hints of
a restructuring problem. Perich asks the court to require the church to
adopt unspecified "policies, practices, and programs" to remedy and
prevent future problems." ' Finally, there is an inquiry problem.
Perich claims she was fired for threatening to sue the church. But a lot
of evidence suggests she would have been fired anyway. By the time
she threatened suit, things had already broken down. The school had
already asked her to resign. It had already told her that her job would
not be available until next year at the earliest. Perich went back to the
school anyway, demanding to go back to work immediately, which
apparently caused a scene. The school told Perich that she was
insubordinate, and that she was putting her desires over the school's
ministry. And all this happened before Perich threatened to bring
suit. Now Perich's threat might have been the final straw. But that
creates a difficult and religiously loaded issue of fact. At trial, the big
issue would be whether Perich's insubordination was so bad that it
alone would have led to the congregation revoking her divine call.
But answering that question would require the jury to decide when
the divine call of a commissioned minister is properly revoked. A jury
would have to go deep into the religious views of the LCMS, through
its theology, policies, practices, and history-all the while being
coaxed toward different conclusions by the parties. This is the classic
inquiry problem, and it lies at the heart of Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC.
B. The Proper Scope of the Ministerial Exception
As the facts of Hosanna-Tabor reflect, the ministerial exception
presupposes a distinction between ministers and nonministers that
ends up being somewhat messy in real life. The religious significance
of a position is a continuous variable, not a dichotomous one--
whether someone is a minister is less of a "yes/no" question and more
of a "how much" question. To be sure, there are those who are clearly
ministers within any definition of the term-parish priests, for
273. This demand appears in both the EEOC's complaint and Perich's complaint. See
Joint Appendix, supra note 264, at *17 (EEOC Complaint); Complaint at 6-7, EEOC v.
Hosanna-Tabor, 582 F. Supp. 2d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (No. 07-14124), 2008 WL 2377826,
at *6-7.
274. See Joint Appendix, supra note 264, at *17 (EEOC Complaint); Complaint, supra
note 273, at 73a (Perich's Complaint).
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example. And there are those who are clearly not ministers within
any definition of the term-the janitor in Amos, for example.275 But
many positions fall somewhere into that hazy middle, where there are
no natural points of differentiation. As a result, whatever line the
Court ultimately draws will be seen as vague and arbitrary. Yet the
Court cannot avoid this line-drawing task, for the alternatives are
worse; the Court would have to conclude either that the ministerial
exception does not exist at all or that all employees of religious
organizations fall within it. Neither of those approaches is acceptable.
Lower courts have adopted a variety of methods for defining the
boundaries of the ministerial exception, but the "primary duties" test
has become the dominant one." 6 As its name suggests, this test looks
at the "primary duties" of the employee and categorizes them as
either primarily religious or primarily secular. If primarily religious,
the ministerial exception bars the claims in question. If primarily
secular, the claims can proceed. Many federal circuits have adopted
some form of the primary duties test, including the Sixth Circuit in
Hosanna-Tabor.277 But other courts have offered different tests. The
Ninth Circuit, for example, used to just ask whether the employee has
"some religious duties and responsibilities.""27 The Seventh Circuit
adds in a presumption that clerical employees (that is, ordained
clergy) are ministers, a presumption that can only be overridden if all
of the clerical employee's duties are secular in nature. 279 Some courts
275. For more on Amos, see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
276. See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for a Deferential
Primary Duties Test 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1776 (2008) ("Nearly all courts determine
ministerial status under a primary duties test ....").
277. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 597 F.3d at 778; Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 207
(2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 304 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v.
Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985). The "primary duties" test
comes out of an early law review article which proposed it. See generally Bruce N. Bagni,
Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by
Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979).
278. See Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 598 F.3d 668, 676 (9th Cir.
2010). The Ninth Circuit, taking Alcazaren banc, subsequently rejected crafting any test at
all. See Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("We leave for another day the formulation of a general test because,
under any reasonable construction of the ministerial exception, Rosas meets the definition
of a minister.").
279. See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477-78 (7th Cir. 2008).
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have consciously avoided formulating any test, believing things are
better handled case-by-case.28 °
This Article will end up criticizing the primary-duties test, but we
should begin by emphasizing what the primary-duties test gets right.
The primary-duties test rightly recognizes that labels may not match
up perfectly with reality-whether a church calls someone a minister
should not always control whether that person falls within the
ministerial exception. There are problems in both directions. On one
hand, a church could simply call someone a minister without that
term having much meaning at all. 281 On the other, a church might not
call someone a minister, even though he or she performs important
religious duties and functions as a minister in every respect.282 Some
religious denominations do not ordain clergy at all, sometimes for
theological reasons-surely such groups might still have positions that
rightly would fall within the ministerial exception, properly
conceived. All this is to say that whether someone is called a minister
should not always be dispositive.283 This also makes sense from
another angle, too. We call it the "ministerial exception" as
convenient shorthand. But linguistics should not control reality: The
scope of the ministerial exception should be determined by the
280. See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.
2010); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (1lth
Cir. 2000); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th
Cir. 1991).
281. See, e.g., Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292 (pointing out that churches cannot "label[] a
person a religious official as a mere 'subterfuge' to avoid statutory obligations"); Tomic v.
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 2006) (making the same point).
Fifty years ago, the Selective Service laws contained a "ministerial exception"
which exempted ministers from the draft. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(g) (2006). The Court took
it as obvious that not every person in a religious organization could qualify as a minister,
even if he earnestly believed himself to be. See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389,
394 (1953) ("Certainly all members of a religious organization or sect are not entitled to
the exemption by reason of their membership, even though in their belief each is a
minister.").
282. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(concluding that "the ministerial exception encompasses all employees of a religious
institution, whether ordained or not, whose primary functions serve its spiritual and
pastoral missions" (citing Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772
F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985))).
283. See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801
(4th Cir. 2000) ("Our inquiry thus focuses on 'the function of the position' at issue and not
on categorical notions of who is or is not a 'minister.'" (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at
1168)); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. Unit A Jul.
1981) ("While religious organizations may designate persons as ministers for their
religious purposes free from any governmental interference, bestowal of such a
designation does not control their extra-religious legal status.").
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breadth of its underlying rationales, not by the semantic meaning of
the word "minister." The primary-duties test gets all this right.
But the primary-duties test has some difficulties and some
defects--difficulties and defects that can perhaps best be explored by
looking at the Sixth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor.
The court in Hosanna-Tabor rightly examines Perich's work duties; it
explains how there are both religious and nonreligious dimensions to
her job. But the court resolves the issue by dividing up Perich's work
duties between the religious and nonreligious in terms of time, as if
Perich were a lawyer billing her work to two different clients. Much
of the Sixth Circuit's opinion simply counts minutes on the clock.
Thirty minutes a day go to religious instruction (religion class four
days a week, chapel on the fifth); five to ten minutes a day are spent
on morning devotions; six minutes a day are devoted to prayer (two
minutes, three times a day). All told, that is about forty-five minutes
on religion. Because that is less than half of the seven-hour school
day, Perich is not a minister.2 84  This summary somewhat
oversimplifies the Sixth Circuit's analysis, but not by much.
The court's analysis strives for objectivity, but it backhandedly
illustrates some difficulties with the primary-duties test. First and
foremost, it presumes this clear-cut distinction between religious
duties and nonreligious duties that just breaks down in practice.285
The court treats the six-or-so hours spent on topics like reading and
284. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
779-80 (6th Cir. 2010).
285. The Supreme Court has frequently noticed this in other contexts. See, e.g., Corp.
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("What makes the application of a religious-secular
distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not self-evident."); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (noting that separating the
secular from the religious is "a difficult and delicate task"); see also New York v.
Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) ("The prospect of church and state litigating in
court about what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment."). For another elaboration on
this point, consider some remarks by Judge Kleinfeld:
When the Pope washes feet on the Thursday before Easter, that is not secular
hygiene, and the Pope is not a pedicurist. Confession to a priest and confession to
a psychiatrist may have the same content, but that does not make confessing to a
priest secular. Fitness clubs and Falun Gong both perform calisthenics. Religious
missionaries and Peace Corps volunteers both perform humanitarian work, but
only the latter is secular. Humanitarian work may be a secular or a religious
activity, depending on the motivation and meaning among those who perform it.
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 745 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
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writing as nonreligious in nature. But it is not clear why. Perich was
supposed to integrate religion into every subject; before the litigation
began, she spoke enthusiastically about doing so.286 The Supreme
Court used to routinely assume that such integration happened all the
time in religious schools2 7 -out of this assumption came the ban on
government aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions.288 Perich's
reading and writing duties thus had religious elements in themselves.
But they also enhanced the more direct religious instruction she
provided. Perich was the students' permanent teacher, someone who
saw them all day, every day, someone who taught them
authoritatively on every other subject. Coming to trust her on how to
read and how to write, her students naturally came to trust what she
said about religion. In the end, her "secular" duties do not seem
secular at all, and even to the extent they are, they heightened the
power of her religious instruction.289
We are not done picking on the religious/secular duty distinction.
It also suffers from a deep level-of-generality problem. Recall the old
story about three masons being interviewed about their work. One
286. In an application form filled out while searching for another job, Perich spoke
passionately about her ability to bring religion into the classroom, even into ostensibly
secular subjects. See Joint Appendix, supra note 264, at *53 (Lutheran Educator
Information Form of Cheryl Perich).
287. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 (1975) ("Whether the subject is
'remedial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a teacher remains a teacher,
and the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction
persists."), overruled byMitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000).
288. Under this old doctrine, educational institutions whose "secular activities cannot
be separated from [religious] ones" faced special restrictions on their ability to receive
government funds. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976). While the
doctrine is mostly a relic now, it does seem to accurately describe the sort of education
that LCMS schools aim to provide. See, e.g., Helms v. Arveson, No. 85-5533, 1994 WL
406406, at *7 (E.D. La. July 25, 1994) (enjoining public funds from going to various
schools including a Synod school, Faith Lutheran, because of its pervasively sectarian
nature), rev. sub. nom. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
289. Many courts have said similar things. See, e.g., Pardue v. Ctr. City Consortium Sch.
of the Archdiocese of Wash., Inc., 875 A.2d 669, 677 (D.C. 2005) ("[M]erely enumerating
the duties in Pardue's job description, many under secular-sounding headings such as
'materials management' and 'office management,' tells us little about whether her position
is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church." (citations and quotation
marks omitted)); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 787 N.W.2d 513, 518 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]eaching 'secular' classes is not necessarily 'purely secular' in the
context of religious schools." (quoting Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm'n, 768 N.W.2d 868, 884 (Wis. 2009))); Coulee, 768 N.W.2d at 887-88 ("While it may
be that the majority of her duties were teaching 'secular' subjects, it does not follow that
her 'primary duties' were secular for purposes of determining whether the ministerial
exception applies.").
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replies that he is cutting stone. Another claims he is crafting an
entryway. The third says he is building a cathedral. 29' Because their
answers are pitched at different degrees of abstraction, the first two
can speak of their work in wholly secular terms and the third can
speak in wholly religious terms, without any contradiction. The
EEOC sees a school that teaches mostly secular things. But the
church only runs a school at all because it wants to provide a kind of
religious education that students cannot get in the public schools.
Like building a cathedral, running a religious school in a sense
involves secular work. But religion is the reason why people run
religious schools or build cathedrals in the first place.
There is also, frankly, a practical problem. Applied
straightforwardly, the primary-duties test threatens to undermine the
very core of the ministerial exception. After all, wasn't Mother
Teresa's job primarily secular? Nonreligious people feed and clothe
the poor all the time; no one would call those actions inherently
religious. Even the work of many parish pastors seems primarily
secular. They preach and teach on Sundays, but they also spend a lot
of their time running soup kitchens, visiting the sick, arranging car
washes, and coordinating potlucks. Surely whether parish pastors fall
within the ministerial exception does not depend on how they happen
to allocate their time between these various tasks. In the wrong
hands, the primary-duties test could well function as a Trojan horse
spelling the end of the ministerial exception altogether.
These problems cannot be avoided, but some can be lessened.
Courts can avoid having to define "secular" duties and avoid
problems of apportioning time between the religious and the secular.
Instead, courts can simply ask whether the employee has significant
religious duties, which would presumably include those who lead
religious activities, engage in religious teaching, or participate in
church governance. 9 ' Of course, any line drawn to separate ministers
from non-ministers will be fuzzy and leave much to discretion. But
that is a good starting point.
290. This story shows up in many places, but Chief Justice Roberts told it recently
when he received the Robert Jackson Award from Pepperdine Law School. See The
Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Thirty-First Annual Pepperdine University School ofLaw
Dinner: Keynote Address, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2009).
291. This is akin to the Ninth Circuit's old test which only asked whether the employee
had "some religious duties and responsibilities." For more on that test, see supra note 278
and accompanying text (discussing Alcazar).
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW
And this inquiry can be made reasonably objective. By the time
of litigation, of course, both parties will describe the plaintiffs role to
fit their litigation positions. The church will highlight the plaintiffs
religious duties; the plaintiff will minimize them. Courts can look,
though, to objective indicators of the parties'joint understanding as it
existed before the dispute arose. 92 Positions have job descriptions
that specify the important tasks of the job. Employers require certain
background credentials-things like religious education, religious
training, and earlier experience in religious positions. Employees fill
out written job applications and go through interviews. In all these
ways, both sides communicate their expectations about the job and
are informed about what the other side expects. And in termination
cases, there will usually be a track record of how the employee and
others similarly situated actually performed their jobs and how they
were treated and evaluated by the church. By looking at all these
things, a finder of fact can determine the mutual, original
understanding of the two parties together. If they originally conceived
of the job as having religious significance, that is what matters.
Looking at job duties captures a great deal, but it does not
capture everything. Ecclesiastical office should be a separate and
independent consideration. Indeed, when it is conferred seriously and
not as a subterfuge, ecclesiastical office should put a person within the
ministerial exception regardless of his job duties.293 The Sixth Circuit
in Hosanna-Tabor treated ecclesiastical office as simply irrelevant.
The fact that Cheryl Perich was a commissioned minister in the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod counted for nothing; the court
dismissed it as an irrelevant title. And this makes a certain amount of
sense. To the extent that titles are just labels without any underlying
reality, they should be irrelevant. But clerical status, in most churches,
is not that sort of title. Clerical status signifies a certain type of
relationship between a minister and a congregation; it signifies a type
of consent by the minister to the church's religious authority.2 94
292. Cf Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 614 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting how
Watson v. Jones required courts to defer to "the church government agreed upon by the
members before the dispute arose").
293. The Seventh Circuit has adopted this principle, but with the exception that the
ministerial exception would not cover an ordained minister if all of his job duties were
commercial in nature. See Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 477-78 (7th Cir.
2008).
294. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) ("All who unite
themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are
bound to submit to it.").
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Focusing exclusively on job duties also goes wrong in another
way. As the Mother Teresa example reflects, an employee's duties
sometimes end up being a poor proxy for the religious significance of
the position. Often the higher one goes up in the church, the more
one's duties become administrative in character and less obviously
religious. The bishop will spend less time performing sacraments than
the priest; the parochial school principal will engage in less religious
instruction than the teacher. The duties of bishops and principals may
come to appear more secular because of their elevated positions in
the church. But the ministerial exception should still apply to them.
At the end of the day, clerical status is an important independent
measure of religious significance. Thus, a twofold theory works better
than a purely functional analysis-for purposes of the ministerial
exception, an individual should be considered a minister either if he
has significant job duties or if he holds clerical status or ecclesiastical
office. Given Perich's religious duties and ecclesiastical office, Perich
should fall within the ministerial exception, wherever its precise
boundaries end up.
CONCLUSION
At the core of the Religion Clauses is the idea that religion
should be voluntary. Each person gets to have his own religious
beliefs, perform his own religious rituals, and choose his own religious
associates. And this insistence that religious exercise be truly
voluntary shows up in both Religion Clauses. The Free Exercise
Clause protects freely chosen religious exercise done by individuals
and in freely chosen groups. The Establishment Clause forbids
religious coercion and prevents religious exercise by the state because
it is a coerced community. When it comes to groups, to be voluntary,
religious liberty has to include two distinct rights-a right to join and
a right to leave. We take this as a given when talking about
individuals being free to choose their religious communities. They
must be free to change their minds. But this is also true of groups,
even groups that hire people.
The ministerial exception is part of the voluntary principle. By
guaranteeing a right to leave to both ministers and their churches, it
guarantees that when they stay together, they do so of their own
volition. This phrasing may sound odd, as it implies that ministers too
are protected by the ministerial exception. But that is indeed true.
The ministerial exception is a form of constitutionalized at-will
employment. As such, it gives churches and ministers precisely the
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same right-the right to leave. A minister who leaves one church for
another cannot be sued for breach of fiduciary duty. He cannot be
sued for stealing parishioners, whether under some trade-secret
theory or for unfair competition. Nor can the old church discourage
him from leaving by suing the new church for tortious interference of
contract. The ministerial exception precludes those claims too.
We close with one final analogy. The statute of limitations serves
important purposes, but no one really likes it. Its purposes are
abstract, while its costs are concrete and imposed on identifiable
individuals. The same is true of the ministerial exception. Its costs are
highly visible; its benefits important but intangible. This Article has
tried to flesh out those benefits, which can be easily lost in the shuffle.
As the Supreme Court considers its decision in Hosanna-Tabor, it is
worth pausing over those benefits-if only to reflect on what will be
lost if the ministerial exception is to disappear.
